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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concern over the effect of toxic chemicals in the workplace 
has generated interest in systems to compensate workers harmed 
by exposure to chemical hazards, and to provide incentives to alle-
viate exposures to such hazards. One state regulatory response to 
this concern has been the enactment of right-to-know laws. These 
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laws, coupled with the establishment of the OSHA Hazard Com-
munication Standard, the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act and other federal legislation and regulation, have 
created systems whereby workers are given the right to be apprised 
of the existence of chemicals and materials which may create a health 
risk upon exposure. 
This Article discusses these right-to-know laws in the following 
ways. The Article begins by discussing the scope and purposes of 
these laws and regulations. Next, this Article analyzes the costs and 
benefits of right-to-know laws to both industry and workers gener-
ally. In Section IV, the Article discusses the fundamental behavior 
assumption upon which these laws are primarily based-that is, that 
dissemination of information regarding chemical hazards will allow 
the worker to make a proper assessment of risk. This Article argues 
that workers do not assess risk properly based on the type of infor-
mation available under existing right-to-know laws. This leads to 
the conclusion that worker right-to-know laws are ineffective as a 
medium to create the appropriate decisionmaking by workers ex-
posed to hazardous substances. Section V analyzes the moral and 
ethical mandates of such laws, showing that right-to-know laws are 
an unnecessary duplication of existing mandates. Next, based on the 
conclusion that right-to-know information is ineffective in assisting 
workers in assessing risks properly, and given that there are contin-
ued risks of latent occupational disease, Section VI analyzes the tort 
and common law systems as ineffective ways to compensate workers. 
The additional phenomenon of corporate divestiture, whereby firms 
"protect" themselves from potential occupational disease liabilities 
is discussed in Section VII. Finally, in response to concerns for 
worker health and safety, corporate divestiture, and the ineffective-
ness of right-to-know laws, a federal program to compensate workers 
who have latent occupational diseases is proposed in Section VIII. 
II. RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAWS 
A. Scope of the Problem 
The right-to-know laws are the outgrowth of concerns about oc-
cupational disease. l Statistics of 100,000 work-related deaths each 
1 An occupational disease may be defined as a disease that is a result of one's condition of 
employment. Examples such as asbestosis (a respiratory disease which results from the 
inhalation of asbestos fibers) and liver cancer angiosarcoma (which results from exposure to 
vinyl chloride) are often cited. 
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year, and 390,000 new cases of illness traced to occupation exposures 
bring home the depth of the problem in the United States.2 Accord-
ing to the National Occupational Hazards Survey (NOHS) conducted 
by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), approximately 25 million workers in America (or one out 
of four) are exposed to one or more of the 8,000 hazards which 
NIOSH identifies. 3 Furthermore, it estimates that 40 to 50 million 
Americans (23 percent of the U. S. population at the time of the 
survey) had been exposed at one point during their lifetimes to one 
or more hazardous chemicals which the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) regulates. 4 In 1983, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics cited that approximately 126,000 occupational ill-
nesses were documented each year.5 Furthermore, the Department 
of Labor statistics indicate that 700,000 people have long-term total 
disability related to occupational disease, and that approximately 
2 million people are severely or partially disabled. 6 Based on these 
concerns over occupational disease problems in America, OSHA and 
several states and cities have promUlgated laws and standards that 
2 u.s. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 
ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 111 (1972) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REPORT]. See 
also D. BERMAN, DEATH ON THE JOB, 44-46 (1978); Note, Compensating Victims of Occu-
pational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 916 n.2 (1980). Both sources discuss the difficulty 
of accuracy in estimates of occupational disease and the probability that present estimates are 
conservative. 
3 NIOSH has a file of over 200,000 chemical products, sometimes known only by trade 
names. Control of Toxic Substances in the Workplace: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Manpower and Housing of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1971) (testimony of Dr. John F. Finklea, then director of NIOSH). The actual chemical 
compositions are not always known. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH, THE RIGHT TO KNow 7 (1977). 
4 OSHA's analysis of the illness statistics for the years 1977 and 1978 indicate over 174,000 
illnesses that were most likely caused by chemical exposures in the workplace. See generally 
Hazard Communication, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,373 (1983) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200). 
5 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE 
UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY (1981), 32 BLS BULL. 2164 (1983). The U.S. Department of 
Labor set out the shortcomings of the data collection in U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, AN INTERIM 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 39-40 (1980) [hereinafter INTERIM RE-
PORT]. In regard to cancer alone, some estimates state that twenty percent of cancer is caused 
by occupational exposure to chemicals in the workplace. TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COM-
MI'ITEE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 120 
n.4 (1980) (citing K. Bridbord, P. Decoufie, J. Fraumeni, Jr., D. Hoel, R. Hoover, D. Race, 
U. Soffiotti, M. Schneiderman, & A. Upton, Estimates of the Fraction of Cancer in the United 
States Related to Occupational Factors (September 15, 1978) (NCI testimony on the cancer 
policy proposed by OSHA)). Other chronic health problems associated with toxic chemical 
exposure include mutagenicity, teratogenicity, and a number of neurological effects. N. ASH-
FORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 77-79 (1976). 
6 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 5, at 39. 
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they believe assist workers in assessing the risks of occupational 
disease. 7 These laws and standards are called generically right-to-
know laws. 
B. Right-To-Know Laws Defined 
Right-to-know laws may be defined generally as "compulsory 
chemical ingredient identity legislation."8 Right-to-know laws re-
quire private firms, state agencies, some universities and other or-
ganizations to provide information identifying chemicals to which 
their workers are exposed (see Tables 1 and 2) and the effects of 
those substances on health and safety. The moral implication in the 
naming of these laws "right-to-know" is that workers have an inher-
ent right to understand the risk of their daily exposure to certain 
chemicals in the workplace. 
Federal, state, and municipal legislation have created right-to-
know mandates. 9 The federal government's efforts have resulted in 
regulation through four statutes: the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1972 (OSH Act)lO which is administered by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); the Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976 (TSCA),l1 which is administered by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA); the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA),12 which is administered by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB); and the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-To-Know Act, enacted at Title III of the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act,13 which is administered by the EPA 
as well. 
7 Not all research supports these figures. One former American Cancer Society researcher 
stated that evidence is not conclusive regarding the causation for cancer related to occupational 
exposures. Dr. B. Hoogstraten, Testimony before Cincinnati City Council hearings regarding 
adoption of Cincinnati Ordinance for Worker's Right to Know (Oct. 31, 1981). Other evidence 
suggests that there is no more than an 8% relationship between cancer deaths and exposures 
in the workplace. Doll & Peto, Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States, 66 J. NAT'L 
CANCER INST. 1259 (1981) (studies concerning the epidemiology of occupational cancer). 
80'Reilley, Right to Know: Cincinnati's More Righteous, Less Knowing Experiment, 52 
U. CrN. L. REV. 337, 337 n.2 (1983). 
9 For a discussion of typical provisions in right to know laws and ordinances, see id. at 343-
44. 
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). 
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982). 
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text concerning 
some of the protections the statute affords to workers. In addition, specific occupations have 
been addressed. An example is the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (MSHR), 
which regulates health and safety in coal, metal and nonmetal, sand, gravel and crushed stone 
mining operations. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (Supp. IV 1986). 
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Section 6 (b)(5) of the OSH Act outlines the underlying concerns 
for safety in the workplace. 14 Within that section,15 the Act focuses 
on setting maximum exposure standards for specific substances. 
Additionally, section 6(b )(7) of the Act requires that warnings be 
made to employees exposed to hazardous substances for which an 
exposure standard has been set. 16 OSHA created a Hazard Com-
munication Standard,17 intended to create uniform requirements in 
the manufacturing sector18 regarding availability of information to 
workers about toxic and hazardous substances in the workplace. 19 
The purpose of the standard is to "establish the framework for future 
regulation, if necessary," and to "ensure disclosure of hazard infor-
mation to employees in the manufacturing sector. "20 More recently, 
14 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982) provides, 
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful 
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately 
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the 
period of this working life. 
15 Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 
(1982), employees have the right to work in places free of hazards which are likely to cause 
serious harm or injuries. These rights include: 
1. The right to be informed of OSHA standards. 
2. The right to have the workplace monitored by OSHA for possible toxic substances 
or other hazards. 
3. The right to accompany an OSHA inspector in a walk-around inspection. 
4. The right to request OSHA inspection of a believed immediate danger in the 
workplace. 
5. The right to contest the timeframe in which the employer plans to correct an 
OSHA violation. 
16 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1976). 
17 Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986). The rule, proposed in 1982, went 
into effect November 25, 1983. 
18 The OSHA standard established a system in which chemical manufacturers, importers 
and distributors must supply information to each employee who uses the chemical and each 
employee of the covered user or purchaser of the chemical. Id. In United Steel Workers of 
America v. Auchter, 12 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1337 (3d Cir. 1985), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit held that the Hazard Communication Standard was valid concerning the 
manufacturing sector. However, the Secretary was directed by the court to state his reasons 
for nonfeasibility of extension to the non-manufacturing sector or to order direct coverage to 
all nonmanufacturing employers. Id. For a general discussion concerning the applicability of 
the standard, see Dube, OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard: 'Right to Know' Comes 
to the Workplace, LAB. L.J. 696-701 (1985). 
19 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983). 
20 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280-81 (1983). For a general discussion of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, and especially the Hazard Communications Standard, see Dube, supra note 18. 
See also Ashford & Culdart, The 'Right to Know': Toxics Information Transfers in the 
Workplace, 6 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 383, 392-99 (1986) (outlining in table form OSH Act 
\ 
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Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
To-Know Act21 requiring disclosure of more information than was 
previously necessary under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 22 
Companies manufacturing, storing or using chemicals must report 
their inventories to local agencies in order to aid in emergency 
planning procedures concerning hazardous substances.23 These com-
panies must also file annual reports with the EPA.24 However, after 
congressional criticism, the $16 million Superfund appropriation was 
withdrawn as funding to the Title III program, though the present 
EPA regulatory activities were to have continued into the summer 
of 1987 under present interim financial arrangements. 25 
Simultaneously with the federal government's efforts, states and 
municipalities also became involved in right-to-know legislation. 
Fearing that the federal process would be too slow to effect imme-
diate change, or that the federal guidelines would not be sufficiently 
stringent, states and a few counties and municipalities enacted right-
to-know laws.26 Although state right-to-know laws vary considera-
and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), their origins, coverage and compliance stan-
dards). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (1986). 
22 Under TSCA chemical manufacturers have been able to withhold certain information 
concerning chemical identities based on confidential business information claims. The Com-
munity Right-To-Know Act will not afford the same confidentiality. Although there are pro-
cesses by which the chemical-maker may withhold information based on trade secrets, "there 
are at least four steps in the process and no assurance that the EPA will eventually agree 
with [the] trade secret claims." Address by James O'Reilley, Cincinnati lawyer and law 
professor, at an American Chemical Society National Meeting, reprinted in Daily Report For 
Executives (BNA) (April 8, 1987). 
23 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (1986). 
24 [d. If the confidentiality claims under the Act fail to be justifiable or if they are false or 
misleading, penalties of $25,000 per day may be exacted on companies. [d. 
25 The use of Superfund money was not supported by Congress, although there were 
indicators that separate appropriations would be supported. Daily Report for Executives 
(BNA) (Feb. 19, 1987). 
26 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.60.030-18.60.105 (1962 & Supp. 1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 23-410 (Supp. 1986); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6360-6399.7 (West Supp. 1987); CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 142.3 (West Supp. 1987); CINCINNATI, OHIO MUN. CODE ch. 1247, §§ 1-99 (1982); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-40c-31-40q (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 
(West 1986); 1982 CONN. ACTS 82-251 (Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 442.101-442.127 
(West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1401-1420 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1987); 
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-8-1.1-2-22-8-1.1-49 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 88.5 (West 1984); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1701 (1974 & Supp. 1983-84); MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 31 
(1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111F,§§ 1-21 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); MICH. STAT. 
ANN. § 408.1011 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 182.655 (West 1966 & 
Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 618.295 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277-
A:I-1O (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-I-34:5A-31 (West 1965 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-9-8 (1978); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4800-4808 (McKinney 1985); N.Y. LAB. 
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bly, there are certain trends in the requirements of several 
laws. 27 
Typically, a right-to-know law will require a defined firm or insti-
tution to identify hazardous substances28 and to create a record 
designating substances that are hazardous;29 set procedures for the 
safe handling of any given substance;3o disclose (through routine 
filings with state officials or by fulfillment of employee or union 
requests) certain information concerning hazardous substances in a 
given workplace;31 post information regarding the use of and expo-
sure to hazardous substances in a workplace;32 initiate worker edu-
cation programs;33 enforce compliance and find violations through the 
traditional procedural devices of state agencies;34 create administra-
tive procedures and general rights of both workers and industries;35 
and insure protection of industry trade secrets. 36 
The result of the federal, state, and municipal right-to-know laws 
is a multiplicity of statutes with which industries must comply. De-
pending on a given industry's location and scope of operations, it 
LAW §§ 875-883 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 22-015 (1980); Pennsylvania 
Worker and Community Right-To-Know Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (Purdon 
1987); PHILADELPHIA, PA, ORDINANCES § 475 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-21-1-28-21-21 
(1986); SACREMENTO, CAL., CITY CODE ch. 17 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-3-203 (1983); 
DALLAS, TEX., PROPOSED CITY CODE ch. 47A (1983); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5182b 
(Vernon 1987); VALLEJO, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 7 §§ 66.010-66.040 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 221-242 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.17.220 (1962 & Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE 
§ 21-3-18 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.58 (West 1973 & Supp. 1987). 
2:7 For the multitude of differences in the laws, see Feitshans, Substances In The Workplace: 
How Much Does the Employee Have the 'Right to Know'?, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 697; McGarity, 
The New OSHA Rules and Workers' Right to Know, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 38, 43 (Aug., 
1984). 
28 This usually comes in the form of a state list. The firm may also incorporate by reference 
the official registries of listings by such organizations as NIOSH, the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. Supra note 26. 
29 Feitshans, supra note 27; McGarity, supra note 27. 
30 The safe handling procedures also may be generally regulated through OSHA require-
ments. Supra note 26. 
31 This often pertains to manufacturers, employees or both. Id. 
32 The requirements to label, to post hazardous substances, to educate workers and to 
initiate training programs differ greatly among states. Feitshans, supra note 27; McGarity, 
supra note 27. 
33 Id. 
34 Enforcement procedures vary greatly among different states. Procedures may include 
penalties for violations, administrative hearings and exclusive reviews of alleged violators, 
and time given to the violator for compliance. Supra note 26. 
35 Id. See also Feitshans, supra note 27; McGarity, supra note 27. 
36 For a discussion of the difficulty of the trade secret provisions and balancing the rights 
of industries and workers, see Feitshans, supra note 27 and Baram, The Right to Know and 
the Duty to Disclose Hazard Information, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 385 (1984). 
\ 
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may have to comply with federal statutes, one or possibly several 
state statutes, and at times municipal or county statutes as well. 
c. Purpose of Right-To-Know Laws 
In setting out the purpose of its Hazard Communication Standard, 
OSHA stated that the standard was intended to "inform . . . em-
ployees properly, and to design and implement employee protection 
programs ... so that they [employees] can meaningfully participate 
in, and support the protective measures instituted in their work-
places . . . to reduce the incidence of chemical source illnesses and 
injuries in the manufacturing division. "37 The Agency stated that 
such a standard was necessary in order to reduce the risk of chem-
ically-related disease occurring as a result of the present lack of 
communication standard. 38 The actual OSH Act was passed to "as-
sure that each employer furnishes to each employee a place of em-
ployment free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or se-
rious physical harm. "39 The underlying premise is that informing 
workers of the effects of work-related hazardous chemical exposure 
will enable "workers to play a meaningful role in their own health 
management. "40 Workers will thus understand the health problems 
that are caused or aggravated by chemicals in the workplace. The 
expected result of such knowledge is that employees will be able to 
make informed decisions about which jobs they should select.41 
State laws have mirrored this federal conviction. Four state laws 
have stated that "employees have an inherent right to know the 
dangers to which they are . . . exposed in the workplace" so that 
they may make informed decisions regarding possible health effects 
resulting from exposure at work. 42 Massachusetts and New Jersey 
extended these basic rights beyond the workplace to the communi-
37 See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,281 (1983). 
38 Id. at 53,283-84. 
39 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970). 
40 45 Fed. Reg. 35,213 (1980). 
41 See 47 Fed. Reg. 12,112 (1982). 
42 Illinois, New Jersey, New York and New Hampshire have stated this as a purpose to 
their right-to-know laws. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1401-1420 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 
1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 277-A:1-277-A:10 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1--34:5A-
39 (West 1987); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4800-4808 (McKinney 1980). In addition, the 
West Virginia law is a good example of the legislative purpose mirrored in judicial decision-
making. "The legislature's purpose in enacting [the right-to-know law] was to insure that 
employees exposed to certain toxic substances at work would know of such exposure and 
would be warned of potential harm from overexposure." W. Va. Mfrs. Ass'n v. W. Va., 542 
F. Supp. 1247, 1255 (S.D. W. Va. 1982), aii'd, 714 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1983). 
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ties located near firms and institutions where hazardous substances 
are produced, stored, or studied. 43 The usual methods state laws use 
to assure the industries' actual disclosure to employees about haz-
ardous substances used in the workplace are the labelling of hazard-
ous substances44 and the use of Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) 
available upon an employee's request. 45 The MSDS usually states 
the trade and chemical name of the substance, the hazardous com-
ponents, physical characteristics, data concerning fire and explosion 
hazards, health hazard information, the data concerning the sub-
stance's stability or reactivity, procedures in case of spillage or 
leakage, safety and handling precautions, and other personal pro-
tection data. 46 
Laws of states such as Alaska, New Jersey, Wisconsin and New 
Hampshire impose an obligation upon employers to train workers 
concerning safe use, handling, and emergency procedures for haz-
ardous or toxic substances. 47 Such laws shift the burden and costs 
of warning and protecting workers against occupation health hazards 
from the state to the private sector or public organization in which 
such hazards are located. 48 Furthermore, such programs aim to re-
duce costs in administering payment of workers' compensation 
claims. 49 
43 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. lllF (West Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A (West 
Supp. 1987). 
44 For example, the Illinois Toxic Substances Disclosure To Employees Act imposes require-
ments to post information concerning toxic substances and to communicate to workers their 
statutory rights. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1401-1420 (Smith-Hurd 1986). 
46 Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) are a part of the OSHA Hazard Communication 
Standard requirement that many states have echoed. The MSDS is a vehicle to provide 
workers with information concerning substances to which they are being exposed within the 
workplace. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986). See also Access to Employee Exposure and Medical 
Records, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (1986). 
For instance, under Pennsylvania law, a MSDS must be prepared by manufacturers, im-
porters or suppliers of chemicals shipped within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The 
MSDS must contain information of the chemical name of the substance (and in the case of 
mixtures, the specific concentrations of each chemical within the mixture must be listed), the 
characteristics, hazards, health effects, waste disposal methods, instructions for first aid and 
so forth. Worker and Community Right-to-Know Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-
7320 (Purdon 1987). Illinois has similar requirements of workers' rights to obtain MSDSs 
concerning "toxic substances" (as defined by the Illinois Department of Labor) to which 
workers are exposed. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1401-1420 (Smith-Hurd 1986). 
46 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6391 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 876 (McKinney 
Supp. 1987); see also supra note 42. 
47 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.066 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277-A:5 (1987); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-13 (West Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.597 (West Supp. 1987). 
48 See Feitshans, supra note 27, at 703. 
49 See Swezey, Workers' Compensation Law, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH LAW, A GUIDE FOR 
INDUSTRY 20 (J. LaDou ed. 1981). 
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Commentators have stated other implicit public policy concerns 
underlying the laws, such as the respect for the autonomy of indi-
viduals in making basic life decisions,50 and the distribution of risk 
and enhancement of efficiency in risk-reducing efforts. 51 It is gen-
erally asserted under these theories that "[ w Jithout full knowledge 
of the hidden but discoverable health risks that result from exposure 
to toxic substances, workers cannot be said to have accepted the 
risks voluntarily. "52 Furthermore, the belief is that an informed 
worker has the freedom to either assume or not assume the health 
risks associated with employment in hazardous working conditions. 53 
The crucial assumption underlying those theories is that if informa-
tion is disclosed to workers, they will make decisions that will reduce 
workplace health risks. 54 Advocates of such right-to-know laws be-
lieve that information concerning chemical exposure will assist work-
ers in their assessment of risk of occupational disease. 55 Others refer 
to this right as "informed consent," and place on such laws an ethical 
mandate that an individual's consent to assume a given risk must be 
an "informed" consent. 56 
In addition to public policy and legislative purposes of right-to-
know laws, there is an economic rationale for the laws as well. If 
workers are provided with information regarding hazards, they will 
respond by taking steps to protect themselves from risk. This ra-
tionale is based on the belief that rational people, when given infor-
mation, will act in their self-interest. The economic argument is that 
under the ideal conditions57 of complete information and job alter-
natives, a worker will demand and receive a premium wage for a 
risky job.58 The underlying premise is that, for the worker at the 
50 For a general discussion, see Occupational Health Risks and the Worker's Right To 
Know, 90 YALE L.J. 1792 (1981) [hereinafter Occupational Health Risks]. 
51Id. 
52 Id. at 1800. 
53 Id. at 1801. The Note further states: "By providing standardized information, occupational 
health impact statements would enable employees to compare the health risks posed by 
alternative workplaces and work positions." Id. at 1808. 
54 See id. at 1809. 
55 O'Reilley, The Collision of Preemption and Deregulation, 31 FED. B. NEWS & J. 365 
(1984). See also McCauley, Wisconsin's New 'Right-to-Know' Law, 56 WIS. B. BULL. 15 (Jan. 
1983); Gough, Workers'Right to Know About Chemical Hazards in the Workplace: A Proposed 
Model Uniform Right-to-Know Act and a Critical Look at Cincinnati's Right-to-Know Or-
. dinance, lO N. Ky. L. REV. 427 (1983). 
56 See generally McGarity, supra note 27. See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.lO9-46.124 (1982). 
57 The concept of ideal conditions in the workplace may be challenged since unless detailed 
information is received and understood one may question whether conditions are "ideal" in 
the purest sense. 
58 W. VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE 38-42 (1983). 
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margin, this premium wage for taking a risk would offset the work-
er's valuation of the actual risk of the job. If the premium wage for 
taking the risk is not high enough, the worker would not accept the 
job. Conversely, if the wage premium is too high, applicants would 
compete to fill such "risky" positions and drive the premium wage 
down. Use of such wage premiums for risks would induce firms to 
reach some socially optimal level of workplace hazards. 59 
The economic rationale of right-to-know laws as well as the leg-
islative purposes for such laws are fairly well defined. The underlying 
premise is that information will be properly disseminated through 
right-to-know mandates. The hoped-for result is that fulfillment of 
the laws' purposes will justify the laws' costs. 
III. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF WORKER RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAWS 
Proponents and opponents of the right-to-know laws have outlined 
the costs and benefits of programs implemented as a result of the 
passage of right-to-know laws. Unions and public interest groups 
have been some of the strongest proponents of federal and especially 
state and municipal right-to-know laws. Again, underlying these 
laws is the belief that disclosure of occupational hazards in the work-
place is necessary if workers are to make informed "life choices" 
about their health and about the risks of exposure. 60 
Clearly, important benefits to the public can be expected from a 
law designed to make workers more aware of workplace hazards and 
to require the prohibition of worker exposures to substances likely 
to cause serious injuries. Simultaneously, such actions can also gen-
erate huge costs, which the worker will bear in many cases. For 
example, a law that forces expensive complexity on manufacturers 
for both relatively safe and unsafe workplaces will impose huge costs 
on those working in the relatively safe environments as the increased 
cost reduces employment. A cost-benefit analysis of a law and its 
implementing regulations will serve not only to understand the pol-
icymaking behind the laws, but also to eliminate those actions whose 
net benefits are negative. Thus, seeking out the most economical 
and efficient ways of achieving safety and health objectives maxi-
mizes the workers' total welfare. 
59 See Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation 
and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. REG. 53 (1984). 
60 Susser, The OSHA Standard and State 'Right-to-Know' Laws: The Preemption Battle 
Continues, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 616 (1985). 
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A. Benefits 
Supporters of the right-to-know laws often espouse moral and 
equitable-though largely unquantifiable-benefits to workers from 
reduced workplace hazards. The general assertion is that a moral 
and equitable mandate exists for lawmakers to create laws whereby 
workers understand and accept risks voluntarily within occupational 
environments. 61 As stated above, discussions of ethical considera-
tions often focus on the right to be informed and the general mandate 
of "informed consent. "62 The underlying belief is that society as a 
whole can benefit only so long as an individual assumes risk volun-
tarily and with knowledge. 63 
Other proponents of right-to-know laws assert that benefits are 
more tangible. Documented evidence of training given to an injured 
employee under a required employee training program may counter 
an employee's claim of employer negligence. 64 Laws passed to aid in 
the prevention of accidents, injuries, or diseases in the occupational 
setting65 are alleged to reduce health care and workers' compensation 
costs. 66 Similarly, it is asserted that to the extent training and edu-
cation reduce occupational disease and injury,67 society benefits 
through reduced social welfare health benefit burdens when such 
systems as workers' compensation do not compensate the em-
ployee. 68 It is estimated that occupational disease-related costs and 
social security and welfare systems costs-costs rejected by workers' 
compensation-are approximately $2.2 billion annually. 69 
61 Tepper, The Right to Know; the Duty to Inform, 22 J. OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE, 433, 
434 (1980). 
62 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. 
63 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.109-46.124 (1982). For a discussion of informed consent and its benefit 
to society, see McGarity, supra note 27, at 38. 
64 Musselman, Having Answers For Right-To-Know Compliance, NATIONAL SAFETY NEWS 
(June, 1984). The ability to counter an employee's claim of negligence through documented 
evidence of worker training programs would be relevant only to those chemicals which are 
known or assumed hazardous. For those chemicals to which the latent results of exposure are 
yet unknown, training about use and handling can only be conjectured, and therefore may not 
aid an employer's negligence defense. 
66 Id. at 41. 
66 Occupational Health Risks, supra note 50. 
67 McGarity, supra note 27, at 39. 
66 See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,328 (1983). It is conceded, however, that this benefit only accrues to 
acute safety hazards, and there is little an employee can do concerning chronic health hazards, 
short of such extreme conduct as wearing often ineffective and certainly uncomfortable res-
pirators. McGarity, supra note 27, at 39. 
69 TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITI'EE, TOXIC CHEMICALS AND PUBLIC PROTECTION 
120 (1980); Occupational Health Risks, supra note 50. 
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OSHA has stated that the largest category of benefits attributable 
to reduction in chemical source injuries and illnesses would be a 
reduction in the social costs associated with cancer illnesses. OSHA 
estimates that through enactment of laws that would aid in pre-
venting workplace disease and illness, the present value of the ben-
efits for a 40 year period is approximately $1. 05 billion from increased 
productivity and $393.3 million from medical cost savings. 70 The 
second category of benefits that OSHA outlines is reduction in the 
incidence of disabling illnesses attributed to exposure to toxic chem-
icals in the work environment. 71 OSHA estimates the present value 
of the cost savings to be over $302 million for a 40 year period. 72 
Similarly, the present discounted value of production benefits from 
reduction in lost workdays due to chemically induced injuries or 
illnesses involving the loss of one or more workdays was expected 
to be $25.49 million. 73 Other estimated benefits in reductions were 
non-lost workday injury and illness cases, turnover costs, and costs 
related to property loss due to chemical fires. 74 OSHA estimates the 
present discounted values over a 40 year period at $9.86 million, 
$16.4 million, and $13.7 million respectively. 75 
B. Costs 
OSHA has thoroughly outlined and estimated the costs of pro-
grams set up to comply with its Hazard Communication Standard. 
The dollar amounts of these costs are staggering, and include both 
start-up and maintenance costs of programs to comply with OSHA's 
mandate. As large as these costs are, they still do not include the 
additional expenses of industry compliance with state worker right-
to-know mandates. The start-up expenditures of the OSHA proposal 
in excessive costs and paperwork burdens were estimated at be-
tween $2.6 and $3 billion, depending on the testing conducted by 
industry to meet certification requirements. The total annual cost 
70 For a detailed summary of quantified benefits, see 48 Fed. Reg. 53,328--53,329 (1983). 
71 [d. 
72 [d. 
73 [d. 
7. [d. 
76 [d. These cost estimations are based on the underlying assumption that right-to-know 
law information will create positive decisionmaking by workers and employers which in turn 
will divest the present social and private costs related to hazards in the workplace. Other 
additional reductions in costs outlined by OSHA are a reduction in search costs for chemical 
information and redundancy of those searches as having a present value of $3,092.445 million. 
For a detailed discussion of related costs and methodology, see id. at 53,327--53,329. 
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was expected to be approximately $1.25 billion. 76 The initial cost for 
the start-up of the program was to be over $603.9 million or $43 per 
employee, with a total annual cost of approximately $158.9 million 
or $11 per employee. The present value of the cost was estimated 
at almost $3.4 billion. 77 Recordkeeping expenses, including storage 
and handling costs of paper and data, were estimated at $14.7 million 
for all companies combined. 78 Implementation of the proposals would 
be $581. 9 million initially and $227.9 million each year thereafter. 79 
Hazard evaluation would cost industry approximately $230 million.80 
Labelling would be an additional $177.8 million to start, with annual 
expenditures of $69.8 million.81 Start-up education programs would 
cost approximately $125 million. 82 
Opponents of worker right-to-know laws outline mUltiple social 
and industry costs created by the laws. Master Chemical Corporation 
voiced the concern that the laws "take away from those companies 
that are socially responsible, which we believe to be by far the 
majority of business, the competitive advantage that they have 
worked for and earned by responding to the demands of the mar-
ket."83 Furthermore, for many well-managed companies, the OSHA 
76Id. at 53,325. 
77 Id. at 53,327. These figures were estimates by OSHA for start-up costs for January, 1981 
and March, 1982 proposals and the final standard that OSHA outlines. For a general summary 
of the analysis of costs outlined by OSHA, see id. at 53,323-33. Start-up costs for state 
programs have been substantial. When California enacted its right-to-know law, it earmarked 
$500,000 in its 1982-83 state budget to fund local hearings on communities' access to infor-
mation concerning chemical exposure. This is outside the costs to industry itself. 
78 Id. at 53,323-33. 
79 Id. 
!'iJ Id. 
81Id. Compiling MSDSs is very involved, even for a single substance. This fact is compli-
cated when a company has varied product lines. For instance, according to a corporate director, 
Rohm & Haas of Philadelphia has spent ten years compiling MSDSs on 6,700 different 
materials. Bluestone, Chemical Companies Face Up to Hazard Communication, CHEMICAL 
WEEK 56, 57 (Nov. 20, 1985). Du Pont Industries has 25,000 MSDSs according to its worker 
safety specialist in their legal department. Id. Even the storing, filing and printing of the 
Data Sheets are expensive. The president of Solulol Chemical of West Warwick, R.I. states 
that his firm, whose sales range from $5-6 million per year, uses a $15,000 combined hardware 
and software program to organize the data. Id. at 60. 
82 48 Fed. Reg. 53,328-29 (1983). It is estimated that costs will be particularly high for 
smaller companies, with up to 2,000 substances about which MSDS forms must be filled out. 
Even large companies consider these costs unwieldy. The Right to Know: Industry Presses 
For a National Standard, CHEMICAL WEEK, 36, 40 (June 30, 1982). 
sa 48 Fed. Reg. 53,284 (1983). Testimony went on to state that the OSHA regulation 
"interferes with the natural preferences of the marketplace, thereby interfering with the 
weeding out of those companies that refuse to comply with its demands." Id. The rationale is 
that with the regulations in place, companies that do not create maximum benefits to the 
market may still be in existence since the market responses will be interfered with by the 
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standard is a costly redundancy that forces companies to repackage 
their present strong hazardous chemical communication programs to 
fit federal and state rules. Undoubtedly these costs will be passed 
on to consumers. 84 
In addition to the monetary costs of compliance, there are psy-
chological impacts and socioeconomic consequences in need of con-
sideration. Many analysts describe the costly impacts of labeling, 
categorizing, or stigmatizing workers who are at high risk in their 
employment. 85 Labeling a worker as ill or potentially ill or contam-
inated may result in increased absenteeism regardless of whether or 
not the worker is actually ill. Research is underway to attempt to 
measure the effects that notification of health risks may have on 
workers and, in turn, on their productivity. 86 
The socioeconomic consequences of notification laws are also likely 
to be severe. Data analyzing associations among work history, ex-
posure, severity of risk, and disability and medical claims reveals 
that there is a "chilling impact on economic opportunities available 
to members of high-risk groupS."87 The placement of "injury prone" 
workers in low risk-of-injury jobs; denial of equal opportunity to 
workers who have filed claims or have been in high-risk jobs previ-
ously; "tainting" of high-risk workers by fellow employees and by 
employers; difficulty in insurability; and cessation of insurance and 
worker compensation programs are just a few of the costly conse-
quences of health notification laws. 88 
Some analysts contend that all right-to-know compliance costs 
cannot be estimated adequately. Questions have arisen concerning 
additional foreseeable costs not outlined by the OSHA studies prior 
to the enactment of the Hazard Communication Standard. An ex-
ample of one conjectured cost lies in the compiling of lists for com-
pliance. There appears to be no ready-made list appropriate for 
compliance to the average right-to-know law. The task of compiling 
the list is extremely complex and time-consuming, and the idea of a 
simple listing is not possible in the short run, or possibly even the 
law, thus not allowing rewards to those companies that provide the most complete information. 
Id. 
84 Katz, OSHA's Rules and Right to Know, 6 NAT'L UNDERWRITER 42 (1984). 
85 Sands, Newby & Greenberg, Labeling of Health Risk in Industrial Populations, 17 JOB 
SCIENCE 359 (1981); Haynes & Sackett, Increased Absenteeism From Work After Detection 
and Labeling of Hypertensive Patients, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 741 (1978). 
86 Haynes & Sackett, supra note 85, at 41. 
87 Schulte & Ringen, Notification of Workers at High Risk: An Emerging Public Health 
Problem, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 485, 490 (1984). 
88 Id. at 490. 
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long run.89 Part of the expenditures for compliance to right-to-know 
laws and regulations comes in the addition of new employees to 
handle required paper work. 90 Such expenses, though not yet esti-
mated, continue to be costs associated with compliance.91 
In addition to the direct costs of compliance there are important 
indirect costs associated with right-to-know laws. 92 Enforcement is 
difficult and often expensive. Even routine scheduled inspection by 
administrative officials will not be cost-free. 93 Protection of trade 
secrets will pose significant costs to some industries. Requiring com-
panies to divulge information regarding processes and chemical in-
gredients runs the risk that competitors will appropriate valuable 
trade secrets. 94 Although most right-to-know laws have some pro-
tection for companies in this regard, the cost to any given company 
resulting from the loss of a trade secret would be difficult to estimate. 
Additionally, under OSHA regulations, special medical examinations 
(including genetic testing) must be performed when workers are 
exposed to certain regulated toxins. 95 Still another cost concerning 
89 In addition, multistate industries have a problem with inconsistent or inadequate regu-
lations. The expense of compiling different information for different locations is overwhelming. 
Gough, supra note 55, at 443. 
90 Finns Unsure On 'Right to Know', ENGINEERING NEWS RECORD 68, 68 (Nov. 15, 1984). 
The small employer finds the process cumbersome. "For every piece of pipe, drywall or paint, 
he must go to the manufacturer and find out what the product is made from." Id. (Michael 
Misenhimer, Executive Director of the New York Chapter of the American Subcontractors 
Association). 
91Id. 
92 Some analysts feel that, because of the inefficiency and costs of OSHA compliance under 
the Hazard Communication Standards, OSHA will turn to the use of a medical removal 
program (MRP), which would require employers to identify and screen workers who have a 
demonstrable hypersusceptibility to exposure to carcinogens. This MRP would occur through 
cytogenetic testing. The rationale of the need of such a program is that, even with OSHA 
mandated protections in the workplace, the problem of individual susceptibility to toxic 
exposure remains. This regulation of worker rather than the workplace is presumed to have 
one important result-the reduction of the employee's freedom in decisionmaking through the 
use of a predictive variable over which the worker would have no control. See Occupationally 
Induced Cancer Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HARV. L. REV. 697, 714-15 (1983). 
Such limitations on worker decisionmaking are often referred to by legal theorists as 
paternalistic. The desirability of such a result is discussed by other articles. Id. See also 
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and 
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979). 
93 Gough, supra note 55, at 458 n.79. 
94 McGarity, supra note 27, at 39-40. This requirement is even more of a concern under the 
new Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act. See supra notes 22-25 and 
accompanying text. 
95 OSHA regulations require that in regard to at least fourteen workplace toxins, employers 
provide workers with a medical examination, which includes genetic tests, before placing the 
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information to employees would be a demand by workers for higher 
wages or safer working conditions. These costs are dependent upon 
the present industry wage and safety standards and the increases 
that result from effects of right-to-know laws. 96 
Industry will not bear the ultimate compliance costs of right-to-
know laws alone. Rather, industries will offset additional financial 
burdens of compliance by passing costs on to consumers.97 However, 
no matter who bears the ultimate burden of these costs, the primary 
beneficiaries of compliance to right-to-know laws are the workers 
themselves. The legislatures, in weighing the program's costs and 
benefits have set policies based on the assumption that right-to-know 
type information will assist workers in their decisionmaking about 
working around or near hazardous chemicals. Whether this assump-
tion is correct, however, is a major point of controversy. If the 
underlying assumption is false concerning the assistance this kind of 
information will give to workers in assessing work-related risks, the 
policy-making suppositions are unfulfilled. The end result is that the 
programs incur huge costs without realizing effective benefits that 
policymakers want to achieve. 
employee in a situation where exposure would take place. The OSHA regulations, however, 
do not specify the specific genetic factors to be examined. As a result, the employer and 
examining physician must determine which genetic traits are appropriate for testing. A 1982 
survey of Fortune 500 companies indicated that some companies already used genetic screening 
programs and that almost one in seven considered using genetic screening in the future---
either in the form of cytogenetic testing (which looks for the number of damaged or broken 
chromosomes in somatic cells) or in the form of genetic screening (which searches for specific 
genetic traits in workers that indicate a genetically based significantly greater risk than 
average of occupational disease from job exposure). 
Because of the worker right-to-know mandate, courts may find that chemical suppliers and 
employers have a duty to warn workers of hypersusceptibility due to genetic traits prior to 
worker exposure. The problem is complicated by the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 
(1973), and Title VII which arguably bars employers from refusing work to an applicant or 
dismissing an employee due to genetic factors discussed in OSHA required examinations or 
other industry related medical testing. The result is that it may be impossible to remove the 
hypersusceptible worker from exposure if the worker, in fact, insists on his right to work in 
an environment that gives the worker an increased risk from exposure. The potential costs, 
then, of litigation due to exposure make some industries fearful, since they have in a sense, 
given the worker information that will aid in the industry's future liability. This phenomenon 
is compounded by the present workers' compensation and occupational disease laws which 
prevent the assumption of risk defense by the employer. The doctrine of comparative negli-
gence may also act as an impediment to the assumption of risk defense by chemical manufac-
turer suppliers. For a general discussion of the problems with the competing regulations, see 
Genetic Testing's Conflict with Discrimination Laws, 9 NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 14. 
96 See McGarity, supra note 27, at 38. 
97 The alternative will be not to do anything despite the regulatory mandate. Katz, supra 
note 84. 
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IV. INEFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY MAKING IN THE WORKER 
RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAWS 
In enacting worker right-to-know laws, policy makers have prof-
fered the rationale that by providing information regarding work-
place exposures to hazardous substances to workers, they will take 
steps to properly assess the risks of that exposure. 98 Such an as-
sessment's outcome is asserted to be twofold. First, at the economic 
level, workers will demand and receive a premium wage for jobs in 
which they incur more risk. 99 Second, at the health level, workers 
will make rational informed choices as to whether they wish to 
assume the health risk by working with or near toxic chemicals. 100 
Unfortunately, the basis of that rationale is inaccurate. 
The accumulated evidence indicates that employees are poor tar-
gets for policymaking based on proper risk assessment. Further-
more, studies demonstrate that workers do not assess risk appro-
priately when provided the kind of information required from worker 
right-to-know laws. Thus, given the inaccuracy of their underlying 
behavior assumption, worker right-to-know laws will merely create 
all the costs of compliance associated with these types of laws, with 
little or no likelihood of generating the anticipated benefits. 
A. Employees as a Poor Target for Public Policy in the 
Occupational Disease Area 
According to economic theory, workers, when provided with ap-
propriate information, will demand and receive a wage premium for 
jobs involving more risk than alternative employment. 101 In the area 
of occupational disease, however, this is not the case. One expert 
states that employees are a poor target for public policy designed to 
reduce the incidence of occupational disease. 
First, employees have relatively poor information about work-
place risks and little control over them. Most workers facing 
toxic exposures do not understand the risks or the manner in 
which their own behavior can affect those risks. Furthermore, 
because of the nature of the employer-employee relationship, the 
worker may have little control over work practices or the types 
of materials or safety equipment used in his plant. 102 
98 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 40-41. 
101 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
102 Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy, 2 YALE J. REG. 53, 57 
n.18 (1984). 
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Moreover, even when hazards are known, workers may have insuf-
ficient bargaining power to obtain wage premiums. 103 In addition, if 
other employment is unavailable or limited, workers may not have 
the true option of quitting a "risky" job. 104 
Policy makers' current solution is to create incentives for employ-
ers to reduce employee risk through the enactment of right-to-know 
laws. The principal difficulty with such laws, however, is that they 
shift the assessment of risk and the choice as to whether or not to 
take that risk fully onto the employee. This structuring of the law 
is based on the belief that the worker will understand and use the 
limited information provided from labeling containers filled with haz-
ardous chemicals, read and comprehend the health ramifications of 
the Material Safety Data Sheets, and request additional information 
and evidence of effects of working in a toxic chemical environment. 
The basis for this belief is unrealistic for the average worker. In 
fact, employees are "a poor target" for public policy designed to 
reduce occupational disease. 105 
B. Improper Assessment of Risk by Workers 
The second error in policy making in the area of right-to-know 
laws is the assumption that, given limited information on safety data 
and training programs,l06 the worker will make a rational choice 
regarding the assumption of the health risks associated with working 
near a particular toxic chemical. Studies show that this assumption 
103 L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH 35 (1980). 
104 See generally W. VISCUSI, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET 
PERFORMANCE 274 (1979). The Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals an unemployment rate of 
8.1%, and that unemployment may be higher than the national average in areas where there 
are particular hazards associated with some types of work, such as the steel industry. BUREAU 
OF LAB. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., EMPLOYI1ENT AND EARNING 117 (1984). A Wall 
Street Journal article discusses the plight of day laborers in Houston, who work for minimum 
wages in high risk jobs where no training is received to prevent injury. These jobs generally 
do not provide workers' compensation if injuries occur. Getschow, The Day Laborer's Toil Is 
Hard, Pay Minimal, Security Nonexistent, Wall St. J., June 22, 1983, at I, col. 6. 
Repairmen for nuclear power plants can receive up to an equivalent of 150 chest x-rays in 
a three month period of radiation exposure. Williams, Ten Minutes' Work for 12 Hours Pay? 
What's the Catch?, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1983, at I, col. 4. These individuals overlook the risks 
for the steady work and the wage premium. For a discussion concerning risk assumption and 
avoidance, see generally North, Employees' Assumption of Risk: Real or Illusory Choice?, 
52 TENN. L. REV. 35 (1984). 
105 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. 
106 Some industries have extensive training programs, even though they are not required 
to under state and federal laws. This practice leads to the conclusion that the market will 
create the proper environment for work safety and is already adjusting itself in some instances 
without the aid of legislation. 
20 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:1 
is erroneous. Workers ignore the information,107 are not rational in 
their decisionmaking due to personal biases and heuristics,108 and 
each worker may evaluate the information differently. In addition, 
research indicates that uniform outcomes from a given set of infor-
mation may not be possible,109 and that a given set of information 
(such as that required under right-to-know laws) does not necessarily 
lead to proper risk assessment. 110 
Workers commonly ignore information provided to them, render-
ing inoperative the notion that information will lead to proper risk 
assessment of workplace hazards. 111 The younger, more mobile work-
ers are a group particularly likely to ignore or underestimate the 
risk of contracting occupational disease. 112 
In addition to those workers who ignore the information, some 
workers who receive the information will not evaluate it rationally. 113 
Studies show that the mere presence of knowledge does not lead to 
rational decisionmaking; some workers may use biased decisionmak-
ing processes to sometimes irreversible degrees. Tversky and 
Kahneman are two leading experts who have researched how indi-
viduals use heuristic principles114 in decisionmaking. These experts 
undertook an extensive study to determine how people view uncer-
tain events, among which may be categorized events such as toxic 
substance exposure in the workplace. 115 In discussing the role of 
heuristic principles, the Tversky and Kahneman article states that: 
107 See generally Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupatiorwl Disease: The Role of 
Markets, Regulation and Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231 (1984). 
108 See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCI. 1124 (1974). 
109 Occupatiorwlly Induced Cancer Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
697, 712 (1983) [hereinafter Cancer Susceptibility]. 
110 See Arnould & Grabowski, Auto Safety Regulation: An Arwlysis of Market Failure, 12 
BELL J. ECONOMICS 27 (1978). 
111 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Studies also show that information contained 
in advertising campaigns is unsuccessful in maximizing choice. The effectiveness of increased 
public information is conjecture at best. Some researchers conclude that information must be 
innovative in terms of presentation of probabilistic events in order to be effective. Arnould & 
Grabowski, supra note 110, at 45; Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Accident Probabilities and 
Seat Belt Usage: A Psychological Perspective (Dec. 1977)(Eugene, Oregon: Decision Re-
search). This kind of innovation concerning disclosure will unlikely be attained through re-
quired labeling and MSDS. Certainly the right-to-know laws have not been promulgated with 
the idea that knowledge given to workers must be presented in "innovative" forms. 
112 See Williams, supra note 104. 
113 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
114 A heuristic principle is generally defined as the methodology that provides aid or direction 
in problem solving which is otherwise unjustified or incapable of justification. WEBSTER'S 
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1984). 
116 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 108. 
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"people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce 
the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to 
simpler judgmental operations. "116 These heuristics sometimes lead 
to severe and systematic errors. 117 Biases are also found in the 
intuitive judgment of probability. 118 These biases often interfere with 
rational decisionmaking. 119 
Individuals err in decisionmaking through the use of stereotypes 
or representativeness as general truths which mayor may not in 
fact be accurate assessments of probable outcomes. 120 As a conse-
qu~ence, individuals create an insensitivity to prior probable out-
comes. For example, if the individual has seen (inaccurately) a prior 
probability of outcome based on reported frequency to that individ-
ual, then he or she may generalize as to future probable outcomes 
inaccurately. 121 
The use of statistical data does not aid in accurate decisionmaking 
either. The information often given on MSDS and other recorded 
information is statistical in nature, showing the ratio between toxic 
exposure and likelihood of injury. However, the fundamental notion 
of statistics is not a part of individuals' intuitive processes through 
which they make decisions regarding risk. 122 When the result is an 
underestimation of impact of evidence it is labeled "conservatism. "123 
Furthermore, the Tversky-Kahneman study shows that individuals 
have misconceptions with regard to chance, 124 and are insensitive to, 
or show little or no consideration for, predictability.125 Often there 
is unwarranted confidence derived from limited information (such as 
MSDS data sheets). If the new information received is consistent 
with a pattern or process (though erroneous) that an individual uses 
116 [d. at 1124. 
117 [d. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
120 See generally id. at 1124--3l. 
121 See id. at 1125. If, for instance, the individual has not seen resulting harms from past 
worker exposure, then he may generalize that there will not be any future resulting harms. 
This becomes important when recognized in relation to the latency issue in chemical exposure. 
The individual may indeed not have seen prior probability of harms to past workers exposed 
to toxics because the injury is latent. See generally id. 
122 See id. at 1125. 
123 The limited ability of individuals to capably attend to rare events is called by some 
theorists "bounded rationality." H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957); Arnould & Grabowski, 
supra note 110, at 35. 
124 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 108, at 1125-26. 
125 "Several studies of numerical prediction have demonstrated that ... subjects show little 
or no regard for considerations of predictability. " [d. at 1126. 
22 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:1 
to assess a probable outcome of an existing event, the individual will 
"lock" onto the existing pattern or process with little analysis of 
external differences in the subject matter. Tversky and Kahneman 
refer to these occurrences as aiding in the "illusion of validity. "126 
In relation to assessment of probabilities, a study by other experts 
indicates that individuals are insensitive to those events capable of 
causing serious injury or death that have very low probabilities of 
occurrence. 127 Furthermore, studies indicate that even where the 
perceived probabilities of an injury or death resulting from a given 
occurrence is relatively high,128 individuals underestimate the prob-
abilities of their own risk and overestimate their ability to personally 
control the hazardous situation. 129 
Still, there are those individuals who ignore probabilities alto-
gether in spite of available information. Instead, they base the prob-
ability of an outcome on the instances or occurrences which can be 
"brought to mind," or the available recollection or imagination that 
an individual may possess on a given subject.13o If the individual 
bases an assessment of an event's frequency of occurrence on one's 
"available" recollection or imagination, the individual will ignore 
relevant factors that will influence probability. This is highlighted 
by the fact that severe losses occur with relatively low frequency. 
As a result, individuals may not appreciate fully or not even want 
to consider the consequences of certain behavior and will ignore 
protective measures they may take to reduce or eliminate potential 
losses. 131 Analagously, individuals may assess the risk of occupational 
disease among their coworkers by recalling such occurrences among 
acquaintances. This does not account for the factor of latency, that 
126 Id. 
127 Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 110, at 29. This hypothesis was tested in relation to 
seat belt usage where there are very low absolute probabilities (around 10" and 10.5) of the 
expected reduction in annual risk from wearing seat belts. Id. at 3l. 
128 This "perceived" probability was taken from responses to questionnaires concerning the 
likelihood of the respondent to be involved in an automobile accident. The probabilities 
assessed by the majority of respondents was one in 100 or greater, with 23% choosing 1 in 
10. This leads to the conclusion that the average respondent did not understand the statistical 
ramifications of his or her response. I d. See supra note 121 and accompanying text discussing 
inaccuracies in decisionmaking based on statistical data. 
129 Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 110, at 34. 
130 "For example, one may assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by 
recalling such occurrences among one's acquaintances." Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 
108, at 1127. 
131 The collection of detailed information that is understandable by the individual enhances 
the problem. Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB. POL'y 227 
(Spring 1976). 
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workers are mobile and the individual may not witness the onset of 
the disease, and that the individual is not acquainted with all indi-
viduals who were potentially exposed to the toxic chemical within 
the workplace. 
Another error in risk assessment may result from an oversensi-
tivity to the probability of a given outcome that is not rational-that 
is, the worker will over-assess risk and deny himself employment. 
This may occur when a salient event has an impact upon the indi-
vidual. 132 If the event is salient, people place a higher probability on 
the likelihood of its occurrence. l33 Imaginability can also play an 
important role in distorting one's assessment of the probability of 
an outcome. Some individuals are simply more imaginative than 
others, constructing instances of frequency of outcome that do not 
always reflect actual frequencies. 134 The problem with imaginability 
is that it may cause gross errors in risk assessment in either direc-
tion: 
Imaginability plays an important role in the evaluation of prob-
abilities in real-life situations. The risk involved in an adventur-
ous expedition, for example, is evaluated by imagining contin-
gencies with which the expedition is not equipped to cope .... 
Conversely, the risk involved in an undertaking may be grossly 
underestimated if some possible dangers are either difficult to 
conceive of or simply do not come to mind. 135 
Clearly, imaginability could affect adversely the assessment of prob-
abilities associated with toxic risks, as individuals may receive lim-
ited information and either imagine and/or ignore probable outcomes. 
Inaccurate assessments of risky events may also occur when an 
individual makes a false assumption based on a correlation between 
two or more events, one of which is the risky event. 136 For example, 
a worker may understand that there are toxic chemicals in the 
workplace that may result in harm upon exposure. This worker also 
understands that right-to-know laws require the employer to inform 
him or her of such chemicals' content and toxicity and provide MSDS 
sheets for study and analysis. Training programs tell the worker to 
undertake appropriate precautions in using and handling the chem-
132 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 108, at 1127. 
133 [d. An example is seen in the subjective (not objective) belief that there is a higher 
probability of a traffic accident which arises temporarily when one sees a car overturned by 
the side of the road. There is, of course, no higher probability at that point. [d. 
134 [d. at 1128. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. 
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icals. As a result, the worker may create an illusory correlation 
between the right-to-know training and workplace safety, thereby 
underestimating the risks of working in the environment. 137 Tversky 
and Kahneman conclude: 
Lifelong experience has taught us that, in general, instances of 
large classes are recalled better and faster than instances of less 
frequent classes; that likely occurrences are easier to imagine 
than unlikely ones; and that the associative connections between 
the events are strengthened when the events frequently co-
occur. As a result, man has at his disposal a procedure (the 
availability heuristic) for estimating the numerosity of a class, 
the likelihood of an event, or the frequency of co-occurrences, 
by the ease with which the relevant mental operations of re-
trieval, construction, or association can be performed. However, 
as the preceding examples have demonstrated, this valuable 
estimation procedure results in systematic errors. 138 
There are other approaches to decisionmaking that create inac-
curacies in assessing risk. Individuals often make incomplete com-
putations and do not start off at the proper point to assess infor-
mation. 139 Furthermore, individuals have biases in evaluating 
conjunctive and disjunctive events. 140 In addition naive or unsophis-
ticated individuals may base their confidences on a narrow set of 
knowledge or information and categorize new information in the 
already established means of assessment. This common phenomenon 
is called "anchoring."141 The result may be that upon receiving new 
information, instead of evaluating the probability or possible effects 
of toxic exposure in the workplace properly, workers may "anchor" 
in their present assessment of risk, and merely add the new infor-
137 "The judgment of how frequently two events co-occur could be based on the strength of 
the associative bond between them. When the association is strong, one is likely to conclude 
that the events have been frequently paired." [d. A contextual example would be the com-
pliance with right-to-know laws and safety in the workplace. 
138 [d. at 1128. This concept is expanded in a later study by the same researchers. Tversky 
& Kahneman, Availability: A H eunstic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973). They discuss "availability," in which individuals "compare the essen-
tial features of the event to those of the structure from which it originates. In this manner 
one estimates probability by assessing similarity or connotative distance." [d. The availability 
heuristic uses strength of association as a basis for judging the frequency of occurrence of a 
given outcome of incidence. [d. The researchers expand on the factors which effect this notion 
in decisionmaking. [d. 
139 Tversky and Kahneman call this insufficient adjustment. Tversky & Kahneman, supra 
note 108, at 1128. 
140 [d. at 1128-29. 
141 [d. at 1129. 
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mation to their properly or improperly preconceived assessments of 
the risk. 
Although some of the tendencies and biases occur more frequently 
with the naive and unsophisticated,142 laymen and researchers alike 
make errors in relying on heuristics and biases. 143 These phenomena 
occur in such intuitive judgments as, "Am I harmed by this chemical? 
Can I get a job elsewhere? Is there immediate or long run danger 
by working in a given workplace?"144 
The study by Tversky and Kahneman leads to the conclusion that 
the probability's inherently subjective nature will lead many individ-
uals to assess the risks improperly based on a given set of informa-
tion. Since there are systematic and predictable errors that most 
people make in their risk assessment, a policy directive requiring 
employers to inform the worker of occupational risks through disclo-
sure under right-to-know laws will have a minimal impact. The result 
is the creation of a costly regulatory scheme that is incapable of 
fulfilling its intended purposes. 145 
Other studies have undertaken a simpler approach in evaluating 
improper risk assessment. It may be, for instance, that each worker 
may evaluate information differently, and that in fact each worker 
may not be affected by an exposure in the same way. 146 Even though 
information may be consistent, in reality there may not be uniformity 
in actual outcomes. 147 For instance, cancer susceptibility differs 
among individuals. 148 The information given by most right-to-know 
laws does not reveal these differences explicitly. Whether the de-
142 See supra notes 107, 108, 111, 112 and accompanying text. 
143 "The reliance on heuristics and the prevalence of biases are not restricted to laymen. 
Experienced researchers are also prone to the same biases-when they think intuitively." 
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 108, at 1130. 
144 See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text. 
145 The only validity to such a policy is the moral conviction that workers have the "RIGHT" 
to know. But the understanding must follow that this right may have no legitimate effect on 
an individual's assessment of risk. Thus, even the moral implications may be subject to new 
analysis. 
146 For a general discussion concerning risk of high-level and low-level exposure to certain 
individuals, see supra note 109, at 712. 
147 Part of the difficulty in evaluating the effects of risk exposure is the disagreement within 
the scientific community of the extent of harmful effects of exposure to carcinogens, and what 
the "threshold level of exposure" is. W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK, 40-41 (1976). 
Courts have had difficulty in evaluating evidence regarding threshold levels of exposure. See 
Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 636 n.41 (1980) 
(plurality opinion) (citing scientific support for the threshold exposure theory). But see Upton, 
Preventive Medicine in the Workplace-Prospects for the 1980s, 23 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 
556 (1981) (citing numerous sources that reject the threshold exposure theory). 
148 See Cancer Susceptibility, supra note 109. 
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termination of significance is accurate is often based on the worker's 
experience. 149 For instance, the most powerful determinant in a 
worker's assessment of risk is the worker's own injury experience. 150 
This anecdotal approach to risk assessment is laden with inaccuracies 
in assessing probabilities of future injury. 151 
Finally, the hope that individuals will act rationally given impor-
tant information is not realistic. For instance, studies prove that 
seat belts are highly effective in preventing injuries and death. 152 
Despite these findings, statistics show that when given the choice, 
individuals use seatbelts only between 10 and 20 percent of the 
time. 153 The traditional assumption made by both economists and 
policy makers is that if individuals and firms have sufficient (perfect) 
information concerning the probability distribution of personal in-
juries, and if there are no externalities, competitive market forces 
will lead to optimal protective choices. l54 The problems with the 
right-to-know laws are that information is not sufficient,155 that there 
are many externalities within the market, and that the behavior 
assumption of rational decisionmaking does not hold. 156 In addition, 
in the case of latent chronic diseases, risk evaluation becomes even 
more difficult: 
149 For instance, the risk of cancer which may be created by environmental factors is dose 
related. Although one may generate data demonstrating the significance of the risk based on 
high levels of exposure, it is more difficult to estimate the risk at low levels of exposure, since 
it requires the extrapolation from the data obtained at higher exposure levels. As a result 
these extrapolations may be unreliable. See W. LOWRANCE, supra note 147, at 38-39. See 
also McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Sci-
ence Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 735 
n.27 (1979). 
150 w. VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE 65 (1983). 
151Id. at 66. An even more interesting phenomenon is that one-third of all workers who 
had experienced previous injuries did not view their jobs as hazardous. Viscusi concludes that 
the "aberrational result" appears to center on illnesses and injuries that occurred on the job 
but were not "an intrinsic part of it." Id. at 65. Tversky and Kahneman would most likely 
analyze the phenomenon in relation to heuristic biases. See supra notes 106-144 and accom-
panying text. 
152 See Arnould & Grabowski, supra note llO. 
153 Robertson, Estimates of Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Effectiveness and Use, 66 AMER. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 859, 861 (1976). A report by the Department of Transportation indicates that 
the mean safety belt usage rate was 14.1% in 1978. This phenomenon is referred to as a classic 
example of market failure, and led to moves toward regulations which required new cars to 
be equipped with passive restraint systems. Arnould & Grabowski, supra note llO, at 28. 
154 Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1973). 
155 See supra notes 105-106 (discussion regarding limited information required to be dis-
closed by right-to-know laws). 
156 See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text (discussion regarding how different people 
will be affected differently by cancer risks, and that individuals are not always rational in 
their decisionmaking). 
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For many chronic diseases, it may be difficult for a worker to 
make any reliable causal inferences that would improve future 
job decisions. One cannot be confident of the efficiency of ... 
[the] learning process until one first ascertains whether [the] 
learning will occur and, if it does, whether it will enable those 
now incurring the hazards to make sounder job decisions. 157 
27 
Empirical evidence has established that in this kind of decisionmak-
ing, individuals will likely err on the side of too little, rather than 
too much, protection. 158 This raises serious doubts about laws that 
assume that workers will make rational decisions in considering 
means to protect themselves from risks of harm. Further, empirical 
studies demonstrate that increased levels of protection create neg-
ative externalities-that is, individuals will view their environment 
as being safer than it really is, and therefore feel less need to take 
actions necessary to protect themselves adequately. 159 
Along these lines, studies show that increasing the use of safety 
information and protection often will work to increase accidents. 160 
These studies also analyzed public information programs and their 
effects on decisionmaking in relation to their abilities to change 
behavioral patterns. Advertising campaigns, for instance, encour-
aging the use and safety of seat belts were unsuccessful in changing 
patterns of behavior that would decrease the risk of accidents. 161 
These studies establish clearly that right-to-know legislation tar-
geted at workers is a poor conduit for managing occupational disease; 
that individuals do not make rational assessments of risk based on 
information they receive; and that investments in safety and safety 
precautions may in fact result in decreased rather than increased 
safety oriented behavior by individuals. 
157 w. VISCUSI, supra note 150, at 64. 
158 See supra notes 112, 122, 127-29 and accompanying text. 
159 "There is a growing literature, drawn from a variety of actual and experimental situa-
tions, which indicates that when probabilites drop to very low values, many individuals become 
insensitive to large potential losses from an unprotected outcome. Instead, their behavior is 
governed mainly by the unlikelihood of the event's occurrence." Arnould & Grabowski, supra 
note 110, at 29. See also Thaler, Toward A Positive Theory of Consumer Behavior (1978) 
(unpublished manuscript); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 108. 
160 For example, increased use of seat belts tends to be a disincentive to safe driving and 
thereby increases the likelihood of accidents and injuries to others not similarly protected, 
such as pedestrians. The evidence is subject to differing interpretations, but the occurrence 
of this phenomenon does have its logic. Nelson, Comments on Peltzman's Paper on Auto-
mobile Safety Regulation, in AUTO SAFETY REGULATION 63-70 (H. Manne & R. Miller eds. 
1976); MacAvoy, The Regulations of Accidents, in AUTO SAFETY REGULATION 83-89 (H. 
Manne & R. Miller eds. 1976); Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 110, at 30. 
161 See generally Arnould & Grabowski, supra note 110, at 30; Slovic, Fischoff & Lichten-
stein, supra note 111. 
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C. Economic Inefficiencies of Right-to-Know Laws 
The political community's expectation is that the passage of any 
law will create some increased marketplace efficiency. However, in 
the case of right-to-know laws, not only will they be ineffective in 
relation to the legislative policy goals, but they also will create 
economic inefficiencies. When analyzing the inefficiencies of the stat-
utes, economists focus on marketplace reactions to right-to-know 
laws. 162 The notion is that the market will adjust when new and 
relevant information becomes available. The mere passage of laws, 
however, does not necessarily hasten or perfect that availability. 
"Once the information is disclosed, then rest assured that the mar-
ketplace will, in due course, make the necessary economic adjust-
ments, and in this way the total overall utility of the community will 
be optimized. "163 The argument is that as the market is apprised, it 
will adjust. In the case of hazardous workplaces, workers informed 
of the employment risks will seek a market adjustment in the form 
of increased wages in compensation for taking those risks. 
In the area of latent hazards, however, the market is constrained 
from making such adjustments. This is due to the fact that the 
latency factor inhibits the flow of information into the marketplace. 
Where information is either not available or slow in coming forth, 
proper evaluation is constrained. In analyzing the problem in terms 
of risk assessment, Tversky and Kahneman go one step further and 
indicate that workers will not fully assess hazards, since they will 
not assess information "perfectly" even if the information provided 
were "perfect."164 As a consequence, the marketplace does not reflect 
hazardous workplace risks, and worker right-to-know laws will not 
enhance market efficiency. 
V. THE MORAL AND ETHICAL MANDATE OF RIGHT-TO-KNOW 
LAWS 
Despite the ineffectiveness of right-to-know laws, some propo-
nents assert that these laws should remain in place as a moral or 
ethical legislative mandate to industry. The rationale is that industry 
should want to provide workers with sufficient information to make 
an informed choice as to whether to work or not to work in a given 
162 See C. Wang, Nat'l Inst. of Safety & Health, Testimony before Cincinnati City Council 
hearings regarding passage of Cincinnati's right-to-know law (Feb. 17, 1982). 
163 [d. (emphasis added). 
164 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 138. 
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occupational environment, and to protect the worker's decision-mak-
ing process. This mandate, however, already exists in other laws. 165 
Both the Labor Management Relations Actl66 and the National Labor 
Relations Act,167 for example, protect workers in this manner. Sec-
tion 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act states: 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to require an individ-
ual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor 
shall anything in this Act be construed to make the quitting of 
his labor by an individual employee an illegal act; nor shall any 
court issue any process to compel the performance by an indi-
vidual employee of such labor or service without his consent; nor 
shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good 
faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the 
place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed 
a strike under this Chapter. 168 
In addition, Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act169 protects 
acts by employees who respond to perceived concerns over health 
and safety in the workplace through the right "to self organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
... and to engage in other concerted activities ... [for the purpose 
of] mutual aid and protection."17o The Supreme Court expanded on 
these rights in the NLRB v. Washington Aluminum CO.l7l The 
Court stated that the concerted activities by the employees for the 
purpose of trying to protect themselves from adverse conditions in 
the workplace were unquestionably activities initiated in an effort 
to correct conditions that modern labor management legislation 
treats as intolerable in a "humane and civilized society like ours."172 
Policymaking is sometimes premised on moral and ethical consid-
erations. In addition, the concern for morals and ethics in corporate 
decisionmaking is a popular point of discussion concerning corporate 
165 The common law gives workers the right to be protected from workplace hazards and to 
be apprised of latent or concealed dangers. See infra notes 173-211 and accompanying text. 
166 Labor Management Relations Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982). 
167 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). 
166 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1982). 
169 This section applies to both union and nonunion workers. 
170 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). 
171 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Nonunion members refused to work in a machine shop which was too 
cold. [d. These minimal protections add credence to the concept that such protections as those 
against working near or around hazardous conditions will fall within the parameters of the 
NLRA. 
172 [d. at 17. For a general discussion of the Labor Management Relations Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act in the area of occupational hazards, see Allen & Linenberger, 
The Employee's Right to Refuse Hazardous Work, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 251 (1983). 
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policies that affect worker health and general welfare. Although such 
moral and ethical considerations are laudible, duplication of efforts 
either by the legislature or the industry to the point of inefficiency 
is unnecessary. The worker right-to-know laws represent such a 
duplication of effort based on ethical considerations. The moral and 
ethical mandate to allow workers to choose their work environment 
has existed prior to the passage of right-to-know laws. The right-to-
know laws expensively and unnecessarily duplicate an existing man-
date, and add nothing to the total welfare of the worker. 
VI. INEFFECTIVENESS OF TORT LAW AND STATE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
Despite the presence of any right-to-know legislation, employees 
must still find a means to be compensated for occupational disease 
injuries. Prior to the enactment of right-to-know laws, employees 
have relied on the common law right to work in a reasonably safe 
workplace,173 to be assessed of discoverable concealed or latent dan-
gers within the workplace by their employers, and to be given 
damages resulting from an employer's failure in these duties. 174 The 
general requirement that employers make dangerous conditions 
known to employees enhanced these common law rights in the work-
place. 175 Employees' rights to be informed were extended to encom-
pass occupational diseases, with employers having the duty to warn 
of discoverable dangers of occupational disease risks. 176 This duty to 
173 See, e.g., Brown v. Sharp-Hauser Contracting Company, 159 Cal. 89, 112 P. 874 (1910) 
(employer held liable for failure to prevent a cave-in); Foreman v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 256 
Ala. 253, 54 So.2d 499 (1951) (employer liable for failure to provide proper ventilation which 
caused plaintiff's lead poisoning); Nichols v. Harvey Hubbell, Inc., 92 Conn. 611, 103 A. 835 
(1918) (employer liable for negligent design of a structure in which plaintiff worked). 
174 See, e.g., Fort Smith & W.R.R. v. Holcombe, 59 Okla. 54, 158 P. 633 (1916) (employer 
duty to discover defects in tools used at work site); Rio Grande S.R.R. v. Campbell, 65 Colo. 
217, 176 P. 275 (1918) (employer duty to discover tool defects); Lemon v. Lonker, 97 Pa. 
Super. 240 (1929) (employer duty to warn of a defective stepladder that servant would 
otherwise not know was defective). 
175 See, e.g., Clayton v. Ainsworth, 122 N.J.L. 160, 4 A.2d 274 (1939) (employer failed to 
warn of the danger of falling coal); Tedford v. L. A. Elec. Co., 134 Cal. 76, 66 P. 76 (1901) 
(employer negligent for failure to warn of the danger of handling wires); Hume v. Fort Halifax 
Power Co., 106 Me. 78, 75 A. 300 (1909) (employer liable in negligence action for failure to 
warn of the risk of a rockslide at a construction site). 
In addition to common law rights of employees, statutory attempts have been made to 
notify workers of chronic disease risk. The history of previous statutory notification efforts 
will not be covered in this Article, but may be found in Schulte & Ringen, supra note 87, at 
485-90. 
176 See, e.g., Davis v. N. J. Zinc Co., 116 N.J.L. 103, 182 A. 850 (1936) (employer negligent 
for failure to warn and protect employee from dangerous condition caused by manganese 
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warn also requires the employer to know about the characteristics 
of substances used in the workplace and to have a scientific under-
standing of the risks involved in using such substances.177 Injured 
employees have used the common law tort of negligence as well as 
the tort of "failure to warn" in occupational disease cases to com-
pensate workers' injuries. 178 
The emergence of workers' compensation laws has, in many in-
stances, taken the place of the common law tort system as an avenue 
for relief for plaintiffs. 179 Barriers to workers' compensation claims, 
however, are inherent in the workers' compensation system, espe-
cially in regard to latent occupational disease. Studies have con-
cluded that the present workers' compensation systems largely com-
pensate only those injured by traumatic injury, but not those 
poisoning); Galeota v. United States Gypsum Co., 123 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 
315 U.S. 813 (1942) (employer duty to instruct worker that inhalation of silica dust might 
result in serious harm); Wiseman v. Carter White Lead Co., 100 Neb. 584, 160 N.W. 985 
(1916) (providing an employee with a mask in order to minimize danger did not fulfill employer's 
duty to warn); Pigeon v. W.P. Fuller & Co., 156 Cal. 691, 105 P. 976 (1909) (employer required 
to warn of possibility of lead poisoning due to inhalation of fumes). See also Bohlen, The 
Common Law Right of Action for Occupational Disease in Pennsylvania, 63 U. PA. L. REV. 
183 (1915) (discussion concerning the employer's duty to warn of risk of occupational disease 
if employer's knowledge is greater than employee's expected knowledge of risks in the work-
place); Occupational Health Risks, supra note 50, at 1803-05 (general discussion of common 
law duties placed on employers concerning occupational disease). See also Schroeder & Shap-
iro, supra note 107, at 1250-56. 
177 See, e.g., Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Jamison, 197 Okla. 387, 171 P.2d 976 (1946) 
(liability of employer for failure to warn employees of poisonous sulphur dioxide fumes); Gentry 
v. Swann Chern. Co., 234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530 (1937) (duty of employer to warn regarding 
danger of dust fumes and chemical particles in unventilated room); Harvey v. Welch, 86 N.H. 
72, 163 A. 417 (1932) (liability of service station operator for poisoning of employee by oxalic 
acid fumes, despite ignorance of such effects on employer's part); Adams v. Grand Rapids 
Refrigerator Co., 160 Mich. 590, 125 N. W. 724 (1910) (negligence of employer with knowledge 
of scientific process, for failure to warn of possible explosion in enamel manufacturing). See 
generally Occupational Health Risks, supra note 50, at 1804. 
178 Annotation, Liability of Employer at Common Law, or Apart from Workmen's Com-
pensation or Specific Occupational Diseases Statutes, for Occupational Disease Contracted 
By Employee, 105 A.L.R. 80, 96 (1936). 
179 However, common law rights to safe working conditions sometimes exist in addition to 
the mandates of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Relying on section 4(b)(4) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1976), the New Jersey court held 
that OSHA did not preempt state legislative or judicial action concerning occupational safety 
and health in the workplace. The relevant statute states: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any 
workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner 
the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees 
under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out 
of, or in the course of, employment. 
29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). 
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suffering from latent occupational disease injuries. The system can-
not cope with issues of latency, multiple causation, and the like. 180 
Several reports have analyzed barriers to recovery under workers' 
compensation systems. 181 In nearly 40 states, the compensation of 
an "injury is attached to the 'by accident' requirement."182 For latent 
occupational disease victims, the disease's onset will not be a sudden, 
unexpected and unforeseen event, which would allow compensation 
under the accident requirement. Furthermore, compensation laws 
do not compensate for every disease; worker's compensation laws 
cover only those injuries suffered in the workplace. l83 Because the 
state workers' compensation systems necessitate protection against 
claim excesses and funding coverage, barriers have been placed 
within the systems to bar compensation of latent diseases requiring 
large awards. 184 Among these barriers are: 
1. The statutes' definitions restrict the compensation of occupa-
tional diseases. One example of such a restriction is found in the 
requirement that the compensable disease be "peculiar to" the 
employee's trade or employment. Other examples are the exclu-
sions from compensation of "ordinary diseases of life," or diseases 
to which the general public is exposed, and diseases that are 
beyond the usual hazards of employment. 
2. Statutes require that the disease must manifest itself, create 
disability or be contracted within a given period after the last 
injurious exposure or the last day of work of the employee. 
Similar limitations occur in compensable death cases. (See Table 
4.) 
3. The time limits in which an injured worker may make a claim 
create problems with uniformity of compensation. Different 
states have different time limits within which a worker's claim 
may be filed. Such a filing will, in many cases, be closely related 
to the time in which the disease manifests itself. (See Table 4.) 
4. Many states bar occupational disease claims unless there is 
proof that the exposure to a hazard in the workplace occurred 
over some specified amount of time. 185 
180 See infra note 211. 
181 See, e.g., CRUM & FORSTER'S OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE TASK FORCE, ROLE OF THE 
STATE WORKER'S COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN COMPENSATING OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE VIC-
TIMS (June 1983) [hereinafter CRUM & FORSTER]; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS 
OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS (1985). See infra Table 4. 
182 CRUM & FORSTER, supra note 181, at 25. 
183 I d. at 26. 
184 Id. at 27. 
185 For example, Idaho and Maine bar claims of workers who have been employed less than 
sixty days with the company where the disease was contracted. Some states, such as Georgia, 
Iowa, Kansas and Utah, require that in silicosis and/or asbestos claims, the worker must 
prove exposure for a substantial period of time, usually 5 years. In Louisiana, the law 
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5. Many states have a "recent exposure" rule. This rule bars 
claims for diseases caused by exposure to hazards by claimants 
more than a specified number of years earlier. 186 
6. Difficulties arise when the female applicant is pregnant. The 
child born of such an applicant is not covered by workers' com-
pensation laws. 187 
7. Several states specify a minimum time in which the worker 
must have been employed within the state. During that period 
the worker must also have been exposed to the workplace hazard 
allegedly responsible for the manifested (or manifesting) in-
jury. 188 
8. The system's notification requirement creates a procedural 
barrier for many claimants. States usually require that the in-
jured worker notify his employer of any claim within a specified 
period of time. If the notification is not carried out effectively, 
the claim is barred. 189 
33 
In addition to the substantive barriers of workers' compensation 
systems, these systems often create limitations on applicants by 
precluding any tort remedies outside the system. 190 While there are 
increasing examples where courts are allowing remedies outside a 
worker compensation claim,191 the basic limitation to these systems 
presumes, until proven otherwise, that the disease is not compensable if it was contracted 
within the first year of employment. 
186 Crum and Forster's Occupational Disease Task Force Report states that many of these 
rules are aimed at silicosis and asbestosis claims, although they may apply to other diseases. 
CRUM & FORSTER, supra note 181, at 28. For instance, in the cases of silicosis and asbestosis, 
there is a requirement by many statutes of a combination of "minimum and recent exposure 
rules." [d. at 28. An example would be that a minimum exposure took place at least five out 
of the past ten years. [d. 
187 Neither is the child covered by occupational disease laws. See McConnell, Genetic Test-
ing's Conflict with Discrimination Laws, 9 Nat'l L.J. 14 (1987). 
188 For example, in Utah a person claiming compensation for silicosis must have worked 
within the state for at least five years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1953). 
189 For a discussion concerning barriers to compensation under state tort systems, see CRUM 
& FORSTER, supra note 181, at 21-29. 
190 Workers' compensation statutes usually are formulated as the worker's exclusive remedy 
against the employer for injuries sustained in the workplace. See Weisgall, Product Liability 
in the Workplace: The Effects of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of 
Third Parties, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 1035, 1039. Worker compensation statutes provide that 
"[tJhe compensation remedy is exclusive of all other remedies by the employee or his depen-
dents against the employer and insurance carrier for the same injury if the injury falls within 
the coverage formula of the Act." 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 65.00 
(1976). 
191 Because workers' compensation systems are generally ineffective and inefficient in pro-
viding full compensation for occupational health injuries, some courts have held that state 
workers' compensation laws did not preclude injunctive relief by plaintiffs. See Shimp v. N.J. 
Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 524, 368 A.2d 408, 412 (1976). See also Schroeder & 
Shapiro, supra note 107. 
In Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa, 27 Cal.3d 465,612 P.2d 
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still remains an underlying barrier to full relief for an injured em-
ployee. 192 
In states that do not preclude tort claims under a workers' com-
pensation system, injured employees are still constrained from re-
ceiving adequate compensation. Generally speaking, workers' com-
pensation and common law tort remedies rarely compensate 
adequately for disabilities that occur as a result of occupational 
disease, especially in the case of latent injuries. For instance, it is 
estimated that only five percent of workers severely disabled by an 
occupational disease receive workers' compensation. 193 
There are several fundamental reasons for this failure of workers' 
compensation and state tort systems. First, many workers are (ra-
tionally) ignorant about the causal relationship between exposure in 
the workplace and latent illness. 194 Second, the employer may be 
protected from tort actions through the exclusive remedy provided 
by workers' compensation systems. 195 Furthermore, even if there is 
no recovery under a given workers' compensation claim, exclusivity 
may apply. 196 
Third, state statutes of limitations create specific time frames in 
which the employee must initiate an action. Theoretically, the stat-
utes of limitations run from the time the cause of action "accrues." 
However, in a latent injury case, where a substantial p,eriod of time 
will elapse between exposure to a hazardous substance and injury 
948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980), the California Supreme Court held that a worker injured by 
exposure to asbestos could sue his employer outside the workers' compensation system. The 
case involved aggravation of worker's disease through employer's fraudulent concealment of 
the condition and its cause. See also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 190, at § 68.00 (common law 
suit may be maintained if the injury committed by an employer was intentional). 
Further, if there is willful, wanton or reckless exposure, employees may sue in common 
law tort outside the workers' compensation system. Some courts impose the requirement of 
"specific intent" to injure the employee, which bars some cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kerr 
McGee Oil Indus., 129 Ariz. 393, 631 P.2d 548 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981); 
Great Western Sugar Co. v. Dist. Court, 188 Mont. 1, 610 P.2d 717 (1980). However, other 
courts have been relaxing the specific intent requirement. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati 
Milacron Chemicals, 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 
161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). For a general discussion of intentional injury as a 
basis for common law compensation to employees, see Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 107, 
at 1251. 
192 See generally Viscusi, supra note 59, at 62-65. 
193 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 5, at 411-16; PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 111. 
1941. SELIKOFF, DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-AsSOCIATED DISEASE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 577 (1981). The study found that only 16% of eligible survivors filed third-
party tort suits on behalf of relatives who died from asbestos exposures. [d. 
195 See Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 1251. 
196 Cole v. Dow Chemical Co., 112 Mich. App. 198, 206, 315 N.W.2d 565, 569 (1982). See 
supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the exclusivity rule. 
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manifestation, the determination of "accrual" of the action may prove 
difficult. Defining the time the action "accrues" has been a subject 
of differing opinion by state courts. Some states use the "last ex-
posure rule," which dictates that the cause accrues at the time the 
last exposure to the harmful substance took place. 197 The majority 
of states are turning to the use of the "discovery rule,"198 which 
provides that the statute of limitations begins to run when the 
injured party knows or reasonably should have known of the in-
jury. 199 However, other states use the formula that the statute begins 
to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known that injury 
existed,2OO while still other courts hold that the cause of action ac-
crues when there is a manifestation of the disease. 201 Statutes of 
limitations, therefore, can present a substantive barrier to employee 
compensation, depending on a given court's interpretation. Cer-
tainly, the differing state interpretations placed on the use of stat-
utes of limitations create a lack of uniformity in compensation under 
existing laws. 
A fourth reason for the ineffectiveness of the present compensa-
tion systems is plaintiffs' difficulty in meeting the burden of proof in 
occupational disease cases. Plaintiffs often have difficulty in proving 
a direct causal connection between the hazardous substance in the 
workplace and the injury or disease. 202 This is especially true where 
197 See, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516, 521 (Ala. 1979); Everhart v. Rich's 
Inc., 229 Ga. 798, 802, 194 S.E.2d 425,428 (1972). 
198 Also called the "occurrence" rule by some courts. 
199 See, e.g., Perez v. Universal Engineering Corp., 413 So.2d 75, 77-78 (Fla. 1982). For a 
general discussion, see 51 AM. JUR. 2d, Limitations of Action §§ 136, 137 (1970). 
200 See, e.g., Olsen v. Bell Tel. Labs, 388 Mass. 171, 175,445, N.E.2d 609,612 (1983); Nolan 
v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Mining Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 778, 786, 392 N.E.2d 
1352, 1359, afi'd, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981). See generally Note, Preserving Causes 
of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. Date-of-the-Injury 
Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REV. 615, 637 (1982). 
201 See, e.g., Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1981); 
Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975). 
202 Statistical information concerning the number of occupational disease claims contested 
by industry indicates the difficulty of establishing a causal connection between exposure and 
resulting injury. Only 10% of accident claims are contested, while 60% of all occupational 
disease claims and 90% of dust disease claims are contested. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 5, 
at 69. The large majority of contested cases base defenses on the issue of causality. Id. 
In a report by the National Medical Advisory Service, it was stated: 
Inferences about the relationship between causal factors and human disease are the 
result of a composite of laboratory and human data. Animal (and in some cases 
bacteriological) data provide preliminary inferences. Human epidemiological data, 
particularly high quality studies, such as randomized, controlled, prospective studies 
or observational cohort studies and last, and least effective (commonly used studies 
today), the case controlled studies are essential. When statistical correlations are 
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the injury is latent and where evidence in such cases often involves 
the very frontiers of science.203 Further, the causal connection issue 
is difficult when the workplace exposure is only one of several ex-
posures having the potential for causing the injury.204 Substantive 
medical evidence that will create a "probable" causal connection 
between exposure and injury is often viewed differently (if viewed 
at all) by different courtS.205 The manufacturer-defendant's "state of 
the art" defense makes a plaintiff's burden of proof more onerous. 
This defense allows the defendant to assert that the most appropriate 
means of handling and using the hazardous substance were under-
taken during the time period in question. The defendant is then 
relieved of liability despite later scientific evidence showing the haz-
ard to be more formidable than scientific data indicated at the time 
of the defendant's use. 206 
very strong and compounding variables well-controlled, we have the best human 
evidence. 
In occupational disease cases, even if these inferences are made, the more important question 
asked is whether the exposure was the actual cause of the specific injury claimed. Gots, 
Medical/Scientific Decision-Making In Occupational Disease Compensation, in CRUM & 
FORSTER, supra note 181. 
203 In cases in which toxic exposure can cause cancer, the injury may not manifest itself 
until one or more decades after exposure. See generally Archer & Livingston, Environmental 
Carcinogenesis and Mutagenesis, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE (Rom 
ed. 1983). Furthermore, chemical substances that seem harmless today may in the future be 
found to pose health risks. An example is the asbestos industry, and the resulting asbestos 
substitutes. Recent health studies now indicate that some insulation products used as substi-
tutes for asbestos may threaten lung cancer to thousands of workers. Such materials as glass 
fibers, ceramic-based fibers and mineral wool are being studied as those which cause possible 
worker health hazards. 92 Wall St. J., May 12, 1987, at 1, col. 6. 
204 Contribution of independent factors to injury is a complication in the causality issues 
surrounding toxic torts. These independent factors mayor may not be linked to environmental 
or even workplace impairments. See, e.g., Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 
3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971). Issues of dormancy and contributing factors are discussed in 
Hagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1953). In Hagy, 
the plaintiff who was already suffering from cancer of the larynx alleged that cancer had been 
dormant and was brought to an acute stage by the effect of sulfuric fumes emitted by defendant 
corporation. Id. 
For a discussion of mUltiple causation factors, see Gots, supra note 202, at 17-21. 
205 For example, courts often criticize the imprecision of probabilities associated with the 
introduction of epidemiologic proof to show causal relationships. The medical field defends 
that medical science is rarely, if ever, a precise science and that any diagnosis based on 
epidemiologic probabilities or other bases of research is adequate if properly introduced in 
court. See generally McElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of 
Causation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29 (1984-8ii). 
206 A few courts have recently rejected the state of the art defense, holding defendants 
"liable for failure to warn of dangers that were undiscoverable at the time of manufacture." 
Schroeder & Shapiro, supra note 107, at 1253. See also Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. 
Corp., 90 N.J. 191,202-05,447 A.2d 539,545-47 (1982). See generally J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT 393-410 (1981). 
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A fifth source of difficulty under the present tort system involves 
problems associated with delay. Because of the length of time that 
a lawsuit may take to be resolved, plaintiffs, in need of immediate 
relief, often choose to accept low settlements rather than face the 
uncertainty of lengthy litigation. 207 Closely linked with the delay 
issue is the expense that plaintiffs must be able to bear to pursue 
such a lengthy lawsuit. 208 
Outside the procedural barriers, state statutes sometimes bar 
explicitly, or limit a given plaintiff's relief in occupational disease 
cases. Over twenty-five states have passed statutes barring latent 
disease claims.209 Furthermore, there have been proposals at the 
federal level, such as the proposed Federal Products Liability Act, 
which would create a twenty-five year statute of repose for claims 
that involve capital goods. 210 Other proposed legislation has at-
tempted similar limitations. 211 
As discussed in Section IV above, worker right-to-know laws 
result in some workers assessing workplace risks inadequately. As 
a result of the limitations of most workers' compensation systems, 
workers injured by latent occupational disease find inadequate com-
pensation for their claims. In addition, when claimants are not barred 
from seeking relief under tort law, the tort system provides only 
limited relief because of serious substantive and procedural limita-
tions. 
VII. ESCAPE FROM LIABILITY THROUGH CORPORATE 
DIVESTITURE 
Given that workers are poor targets for right-to-know legislation, 
and that they do not assess workplace risk adequately, analysts have -
207 One study shows that tort suits often settle for approximately half of the wages lost. 
The average settlement was $72,000 compared to the average after tax wage loss of $127,15I. 
1. SELIKOFF, supra note 194, at II. 
208 The lawsuits are equally expensive and difficult for industry. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
filing of the Manville Corporation indicated that Manville spent $24.5 million in legal fees for 
its asbestos case defense, compared to $24 million paid on health injury claims. Rotbard, 
Manville Filing Expected to Have Great Effects, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, col. I. 
209 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 ("No action shall be brought for the recovery of 
damages for personal injury [or] death ... ten years after the date of manufacture of a 
product, where that action is based upon ... failure to warn .... ") Some claims that are 
barred involve capital goods; others do not. 
210 S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a)(1) (1983). 
211 An example was the proposed Occupational Disease Compensation Act, which would 
have created limitations on workers' actions in asbestos related injuries to damages consisting 
of lost wages and medical expenses from a federal compensation fund. Schroeder & Shapiro, 
supra note 107, at 1256; S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1982). See also S. 1643, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1981); H. R. 5224, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
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looked to existing compensation systems to compensate workers for 
losses resulting from their poor risk assessment. As seen in Section 
VI, however, the present tort law and state workers' compensation 
systems do not compensate workers adequately for losses resulting 
from hazardous exposures. 212 This is especially true of the problems 
posed by cancer and other long latency occupational diseases. There 
have been, however, cases in which workers have been successful in 
their suits against employers. An example is the Johns-Manville 
litigation in which the corporation, deluged with asbestos litigation, 
sought protection under Chapter 11 bankruptcy.213 The Johns-Man-
ville case is an excellent example of the ultimate detriment to both 
business and the individual litigants of the present system. The 
business will suffer serious financial setbacks, and the litigants may 
not be compensated adequately if the business is under Chapter 11 
protection. 
Because of concern about the possibility of an outcome similar to 
Johns-Manville's, firms that suspect they may incur such liabilities 
in the future are seeking measures to avoid those liabilities. While 
several strategic alternatives are available, one approach found to 
be successful is to divest the potential liability resulting from man-
212 For documentation regarding deficiencies in workers' compensation program in occupa-
tional disease, see CRUM & FORSTER supra note 181; Kutchins, The Most Exclusive Remedy 
of All: Workers' Compensation Coverage for Occupational Disease, 32 LAB. L.J. 212 (1981); 
Larson, Occupational Diseases Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 
87 (1974); Robblee, The Dark Side of Workers' Compensation: Burdens and Benefits in 
Occupational Disease Coverage, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 596 (1978). These studies conclude that 
the present system compensates well only those injured by traumatic injury, but not those 
claiming complicated latent occupational disease injuries. The system simply cannot cope with 
issues of latency, multiple causation, and the like. 
213 The discounted cost of all the expected claims to the Manville Corporation is estimated 
in excess of $2 billion, which vastly exceeds Manville's $1.2 billion net worth. The company 
cost per claim is estimated at $40,000, with the discounted cost of all present expected claims 
($16,500) and future claims ($500 per month) in excess of $2 billion. Under the Chapter 11 
reorganization, two entities were created: the Manville Operating Company (which will con-
duct the regular business of the corporation) and the Manville Asbestos Personal Injury Trust 
and Settlement Vehicle (which will handle all claims of asbestos disease). Barney, infra note 
214, at 27 n.1. During its first four years, the Trust will receive funding by insurance proceeds 
and cash and receivables from Manville. Id. During the next 24 years, $75 million plus, up to 
a maximum of 20% of the net per year operating profit, will be paid into the fund by Manville. 
Id. In addition, the Trust will hold a sizable amount of Manville preferred stock and 50% of 
the common stock of the operating company. Id. The reorganization plans allow Manville to 
continue operations if it can do so by contributing to the Trust. Id. However, Trust holdings 
may be sold, if necessary, to pay claims. Id. See also Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of 
Product Liability Law, REGULATION 8, 14 (Sept.lOct. 1982). Riley estimates the total average 
costs per claim (including legal fees, expenses and compensation) at $101,000. Riley, Asbestos: 
New Approaches, 6 Nat'l L.J. May 7, 1984 at 25. 
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ufacturing processes involving toxic chemicals by passing down or 
contracting away liability to other and often smaller industries. 214 
These smaller industries often do not remain in existence long 
enough for latent-disease liability to catch up with them, or they do 
not have the assets to cover any substantial claims against them if 
sued by workers harmed by hazardous exposure in the workplace. 215 
The benefit of divestiture is obvious. If there is a likelihood that 
a substance will ultimately (or even potentially) create a significant 
health hazard, the firm benefits by divesting itself of the malignant 
process that utilizes that substance. The use of divestiture is based 
on the assumption that, when the liability imposed by worker law-
suits will be limited by the size of the smaller corporation's assets, 
the larger the corporate assets, the larger the liability exposure. 
214 J. Barney, F. Edwards & A. Ringleb, Firm Responses to Survival Threatening Legal 
Liability: On-the.Job Exposure to Hazardous Materials, Vertical Disintegration, and Firm 
Survival 12 (Spring 1987) (unpublished article) (available in the Department of Management 
at Texas A & M University). 
215 The rationale for such a divestiture is simple. The objective of any profit maximizing 
firm is to obtain an aftertax stream of returns, the present value of which exceeds the cost of 
investment. In making corporate decisions, management will undertake first those projects 
which exemplify the greatest difference between present value and cost, resulting in the firm's 
maximum possible profit. In the area of hazardous substances, if costs associated with those 
hazards (especially latent health costs) were either unknown or unanticipated in the initial 
assessment, the actual cost of a given project might have been substantially underestimated. 
A study by Ringleb and Wiggins states that the expected liability associated with the use of 
hazardous substances in the workplace is a function of the "number of workers exposed, the 
intensity of the exposure, the toxicity of the substance, and the substance's incubation or 
latency period." A. Ringleb & S. Wiggins, Liability and Mass Latent Occupational Disease: 
An Analysis of Comparable Institutional Arrangements (1987) (unpublished article). See also 
infra Table 1 and Table 2. As the latency period nears the point at which it will manifest 
liability to a firm, the difference between the anticipated cost of liability will be from near 
zero to levels up to and possibly in excess of the firm's assets. A. Ringleb & S. Wiggins, 
supra. In deciding whether to continue in business, the firm will face the maximum expected 
liability, not only from present employees' exposures, but also in new workers adding to the 
pool of possible litigants. Id. One way to avoid this anticipated liability is to divest the firm 
of its liability producing operations. I d. Some firms make the decision to switch to less 
hazardous substances, adding to the cost of manufacturing a given product. For example, dye 
manufacturers in most countries have voluntarily stopped producing beta-naphthylamine, a 
known carcinogen, after finding new ways of developing the same products without its use. 
W. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL CANCERS OF THE URINARY SYSTEM (1969). Other companies, 
concerned with liabilities for prenatal injuries, exclude women of child-bearing potential from 
certain jobs. McGarity & Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 
999 (1981); Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illnesses, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1983). The Olin Corporation went so far as to develop a policy entitled 
"Female Employment and Fetal Vulnerability." Krause, Pregnant Women in the Workplace: 
A Company Program to Control Toxic Exposures, 119 NAT'L SAFETY NEWS 59 (1979). The 
other way to avoid anticipated liability is to divest the process to smaller firms. In essence, 
the management decides to divest the firm of the use of hazardous processes and the potential 
future liabilities that continuation with such processes assures. 
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Therefore, in the absence of mandatory insurance coverage, the 
process is passed down to smaller corporate entities. All costs con-
sidered (taking into account both production and liability costs), the 
process can then be undertaken much less expensively by a small 
corporation.216 Empirical evidence of this phenomenon substantiates 
the existence of the practice. 217 
The effect of this corporate divestiture is staggering to the worker. 
As discussed above, tort and state worker compensation systems 
are not always satisfactory media for compensation. Moreover, in 
those cases in which the tort system could be used and could be at 
least partially successful in compensating, workers are likely to find 
that their chances of recovery will be slight against small firms with 
limited assets. The end result of the phenomenon is a debilitating 
impact on compensation considerations to workers exposed to haz-
ardous substances. 
To summarize, given certain information about hazards in the 
workplace, workers do not assess risk properly. At the time workers 
are confronted with the reality of toxic exposure in the workplace, 
they find avenues of compensation through the tort system and the 
state workers compensation systems filled with procedural and sub-
216 The Allied Chemical Corporation (Allied) case provides a good example. Moore v. Allied 
Chemical Corp., 480 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Va. 1969). In the late 1940s, a chemist for Allied 
invented a compound commonly known as Kepone in the manufacture of various insecticides 
and pesticides. [d. at 367. Virtually all Kepone produced in the United States was exported 
because the Food and Drug Administration prohibited its use on food crops in the United 
States in the early 1960s. [d. For several years, several independent companies produced 
most of the Kepone for Allied. [d. However, in 1966 Allied decided to produce Kepone in its 
"Semi-Works" facility at Hopewell, Virginia. [d. Production commenced in that year and 
continued until 1974. [d. 
For reasons which were in dispute, Allied eventually decided to terminate its production of 
Kepone and "go outside" for its Kepone requirements. [d. at 367-68. On November 30, 1973, 
Allied executed an agreement with Life Science Products Company (LSP) for the production 
of Kepone. [d. at 368. Under the agreement, Allied agreed to provide LSP with all the 
necessary raw materials which LSP would process and convert into Kepone. [d. Allied agreed 
to receive the finished product in drums supplied by Allied at LSP's plant and to pay for 
certain quantities of the Kepone as produced. [d. Title to all raw materials and to the Kepone 
produced by LSP remained at all times in Allied. [d. The case resulted in the court piercing 
the corporate veil and finding Allied liable for injuries sustained by workers in the LSP plant. 
Had the court been unable to pierce the veil, the workers would have had their recovery 
limited to the assets of LSP rather than Allied. See id. 
217 See infra Table 3; Barney, Edwards & Ringleb, supra note 214. This phenomenon was 
substantiated in empirical results of a multiple regression analysis. [d. at 17. Those manufac-
turing industries experiencing the largest exposure to hazardous substances are also experi-
encing the fastest growth in small corporate entities. Preliminary evidence appears to be that 
in order to limit potential liability and eventually eliminate their liability through the use of 
hazardous substances, businesses are passing liability down to smaller entities. For a detailed 
analysis of the divestiture phenomenon, see id. 
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stantive barriers. Ultimately, if they are able to surmount procedural 
and substantive obstacles, they may find themselves in many in-
stances confronted with seeking to obtain compensation from a small 
corporation with limited funds and little or no insurance. Against 
such odds, workers will increasingly find relief from latent injuries 
associated with hazardous substance exposure in the workplace only 
from social security, medicare, food stamps, welfare, and family 
funds. 
VIII. PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAM FOR 
LATENT OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
The ineffectiveness of the right-to-know laws, the failure of com-
pensation systems, and the phenomenon of divestiture of malignant 
manufacturing processes seriously undermine a worker's ability to 
gain compensation for latent workplace injuries. Further, no present 
legislation meets the need for a compensation system both to com-
pensate injured employees and to create incentives for large firms 
not to divest themselves of liabilities. Even if workers could assess 
information properly and make choices based on that information, 
the problem of corporate divestiture in the face of uncertain liability 
all but ensures that no remedy awaits workers who have suffered 
an occupational exposure and have yet to manifest injury. In addi-
tion, some products, now considered to be safe, may be found unsafe 
in the future, while the harm to the exposed workers will already 
exist. Further, two safe substances may interact to create a third, 
unsafe substance or reaction. The need for a compensation system, 
therefore, is clear. Workers need some kind of system of compen-
sation when they do not assess risk properly, when they are exposed 
despite the relevant information available to the public or private 
sector, or when important scientific information concerning a hazard 
emerges after the harmful exposure. 
Proposed legislation has attempted to remedy the problem. Pro-
posals to set increased informational guidelines, however, will be 
ineffective given the discussion in Section IV concerning improper 
risk assessment by employees. On the other hand, proposed legis-
lation to create enhanced safety performance levels in the workplace, 
though helpful concerning substances about which exposure effects 
are at least reasonably well known and understood, is not helpful at 
all concerning substances about which exposure effects are not 
known. The conclusion, therefore, is that one simply cannot regulate 
what one does not know. Furthermore, it is naive to assume that 
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there will be no future hazardous exposure in the workplace. Even 
under the most optimistic analysis that there will be no new discov-
eries of latent injuries concerning chemicals that manufacturers have 
heretofore assumed safe, there still remain the problems of technical 
malfunctions and worker error that result in harmful exposure to 
workers. A better compensation system than those under existence 
or presently under legislative consideration is needed. 
The proposed Federal Compensation Program for Latent Occu-
pational Disease herein will remedy many of the present system's 
failures. 218 Under this program, a payroll tax will establish a com-
pensation system fund from which workers may find relief for inju-
ries due to hazardous workplace exposure. System regulation will 
be closely tied with the National Institute of Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (NIOSH).219 NIOSH may consider taxa-
tion of those businesses whose present operations provide "more 
risk" to employee health than usual business activities. 
The federal compensation system proposed would handle only la-
tent occupational disease. Since latent occupational diseases are 
those which pose the largest evidentiary and procedural issues under 
state tort and workers' compensation systems, this is the area of 
compensation that the proposed federal program would address. 
218 Other alternatives to a proposed federal workers' compensation system have inherent 
problems similar to those of the present system. The alternatives often presented are bonding, 
corporate officer liability, director liability, managerial liability, injury taxes,· mandatory in-
surance, increased informational systems, and increased safety regulation. Bonding, injury 
taxes, mandatory insurance and increased safety regulation as alternative systems present 
problems inherent in latency of occupational disease. Because it is impossible to determine 
the extent of the harm to the worker, it is impossible to anticipate the extent to which a finn 
should be bonded or taxed, or should obtain insurance or increase safety. Corporate liability 
creates the divestiture problems discussed in Section VII of this Article. Director and man-
agerial liability create similar problems that divestiture presents. When injuries are latent, 
often the directors or managers have died, are difficult to find for jurisdictional purposes, or 
have inadequate assets to handle the large sums asked for in occupational disease lawsuits. 
The alternative of using increased informational systems has two problems. One is outlined 
in the discussion in Section IV of this Article concerning improper risk assessment. Another 
problem rests in the latency issue-it is impossible to inform about that which is unknown. 
219 The use of NIOSH is preferred to OSHA in this role. NIOSH was established by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 651-678 (1976)), in conjunction with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA). [d. § 651 (1982). The role of OSHA was regulatory in nature and was to create 
uniform federal rules for safer workplace conditions. [d. § 655. OSHA was given the power 
to enforce civil penalties and initiate court actions where necessary. [d. §§ 655-659. NIOSH 
was to complement regulation by OSHA through the development of standards for industrial 
safety and hygiene. [d. §§ 669, 671. The development of standards to prevent occupational 
disease was to be accomplished through research and education programs set up by NIOSH. 
[d. 
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The funding of the proposed system would be similar to the pres-
ent social security system in which both employees and employers 
share the program's costs. The proposed legislation will take the 
present burden of occupational disease away from the private sector 
(Le., through worker-provided payment) and the public sector (Le., 
through social security, welfare and the like).220 NIOSH will be 
closely tied to the system, since evidentiary and other procedural 
requirements concerning occupational disease are closely related to 
information which NIOSH either possesses or has the potential for 
developing. 
The advantages of the federal compensation program are multiple. 
First, there will be a fund set aside for the sole purpose of compen-
sating occupational latent diseases, an area that is not being handled 
satisfactorily by present compensation systems. Second, the proce-
dural and substantive barriers of existing systems will not be pres-
ent, since compensation will accrue at the time the disease manifests 
itself. Third, NIOSH will administer the program. Arguably NIOSH 
is in a better position to understand latent disease issues because its 
time is spent researching and developing standards for industrial 
safety and hygiene problems, and preventing occupational disease. 221 
Fourth, the federal compensation program will hasten the compen-
sation of injured applicants-an inherent strength of regulatory com-
pensation systems outside state tort systems. Fifth, it will take much 
220 In cases in which occupational diseases are not covered by the industry or workers' 
compensation, public programs have carried the burden of their costs. Such public programs 
include Social Security, welfare, food stamps, Medicare, Medicaid or private programs set up 
by workers and their families. An indication of the expense of these public programs is that 
during a ten month period in 1980, the Social Security system paid $11 billion in worker 
disability payments. Effects of OASDI Benefit Increase, December, 1984, 48 Soc. SECURITY 
BULL. 45 (July 1985) (Social Security Administration, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services). Worker disability outlays were reported to cost the Social Security system approx-
imately 17% of total 1980 trust fund expenditures. Occupational Disease Compensation and 
Social Security: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on 
Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1981) (statement of Warren J. Smith, Sec-
retary-Treasurer, Ohio AFL-CIO, and Chairman of the Board, Workers' Institute for Safety 
and Health). 
As far as private costs borne by workers and their families, research indicates that the 
average loss in productive output per worker was $380,000 (1981) for 515 asbestos-associated 
disability deaths among insulation workers. JOHNSON & HELLER, THE ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 365-40 (1981). The average 
replacement of the costs by compensation or other transfer of payments was estimated to be 
only 40% of the average private costs, calculated to be $190,000 per family. The public and 
private burden of the costs was estimated to be approximately $500,000 per worker. Id. at 
73. 
221 29 U.S.C. §§ 669, 671 (1982); see also supra note 219 (the use of NIOSH). 
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of the compensation burden away from the public and private sector 
(now handled through federal social security, welfare programs and 
the like) and place the costs on those involved directly with occu-
pational disease-industries that manufacture or use hazardous sub-
stances and individuals working within those industries. 222 Sixth, 
because they will know that a federal system will handle the present 
uncertainty of latent occupational disease, firms will no longer have 
incentive to divest themselves of liability. The placement of the costs 
of doing business, once anticipated, will rest in the hands of larger 
firms who have greater incentives to handle hazardous substances 
appropriately. 223 
Like any compensation system, the proposed system will not be 
without limitations. These limitations are twofold-compensation 
limits and exclusion of remedies under the tort system. NIOSH will 
set monetary limitations based on available funds and scientific data 
concerning the nature and extent of the occupational disease. The 
necessity is obvious. Without a limitation, an unanticipated disease 
could deplete the fund quickly, thereby depriving future recipients 
of any compensation. The exclusion of remedies under tort systems 
creates certainty in business, which will in turn create disincentives 
to the unfavorable consequences of divestiture. The advantage again 
will encourage large firms to handle hazardous manufacturing pro-
cesses, which is preferable to handling by small firms. 224 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Under the present system of use of chemicals in U.S. manufac-
turing processes, legislatures must attempt to regulate industries 
and create compensation systems to workers injured by hazardou& 
substances in the workplace. Given the fact that present policy and 
economic considerations run counter to sweeping legislation that 
would take chemicals out of the workplace, it is the responsibility of 
legislatures to create the best system of compensation and regulation 
concerning the use and manufacture of such chemicals. 
222 See supra note 220 and accompanying text, regarding the placement of the present costs 
of uncompensated latent diseases on the private and public sector as a whole. 
223 In regard to reasons for corporate divestiture, see discussion in Section VII of this 
Article. Some analysts believe that larger firms are a better recepticle for technology that 
would create safer working conditions. Larger firms have the capital for research concerning 
safety conditions in the workplace. Further, they have incentives to create an injury-free 
workplace in order to protect the corporate goodwill and solidify the corporation's longevity. 
Ringleb & Wiggins, supra note 215. 
224 See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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Worker right-to-know laws are based on traditional policies of 
informed consent and informed decisionmaking. Though these prem-
ises make sense in an ideal .workplace, they are erroneous as to 
actual outcome. The result is costly compliance without the benefit 
of attaining the policy-setting goals of the laws. Furthermore, pres-
ent workers' compensation and tort law systems present procedural 
and substantive barriers that prevent adequate compensation, es-
pecially in the area of latent occupational disease. The phenomenon 
of corporate divestiture in the face of uncertain occupational disease 
liability serves to complicate a worker's ability to be compensated. 
A reevaluation of the value of worker right-to-know laws is nec-
essary by federal, state, and municipal legislatures, and by regula-
tory agencies in order to correct these errors in policymaking. The 
right-to-know laws and present compensation systems are ineffective 
in dealing with the problems of latent occupational disease. The need 
for federal legislation as proposed herein is therefore paramount in 
effecting maximum benefits to workers and industry with minimum 
costs under the present uncertainties of latent occupational disease. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1. 
Substances for which there is evidence of carcinogenicity in man derived from occupational settings 
Substance Category of evidence and site Occupations2 
sufficient 1 limited inadequate 
A. ORGANIC SUBSTANCES 
1. Aromatic hydrocarbons 
Coal soot Lungs, skin Larynx, kidney Gashouse workers; asphalt, 
Coal tar scrotum, urine coal tar, and pitch workers; 
Other products of bladder coke-oven workers; miners; 
other combustion still cleaners; chimney 
sweeps 
Petroleum Lungs, skin, nasal cavity, Contact with lubricating, 
Petroleum coke scrotum larynx cooling, or fuel oils, or with 
Wax paraffin, wax, coke or fillers 
Creosote retortmen; textile weavers; 
Anthracene diesel and jet testers 
Paraffin 
Shale oils 
Mineral oils 
Soots, tars and oils 
Benzene Hematopoietic Explosives, rubber cement 
tissues workers; distillers; dye users; 
(leukemia) painters; shoemakers; 
furniture finishers; glue 
makers; linoleum makers; 
petrochemical workers; 
styrene makers 
Auramine Urine bladder Dyestuffs manufacturers and 
Benzidine users; rubber workers 
B-naphthylamine (pressmen, filtermen, 
x-napthylamine laborers); textile dyers; paint 
Magenta manufacturers 
4-aminodiphenyl 
2. Alkylating agents 
Mustard gas Lung Larynx, Trachea, Mustard gas workers 
pharynx nasal sinuses 
Vinyl chloride Liver Central Lympho- Producers and polymer 
(angiosarcoma) nervous hematopoietic producers 
system, lung tissues, 
prostate 
stomach, 
urine bladder 
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TABLE 1. Continued 
Substance Category of evidence and site 
Bis( chloromethyl) 
ether 
Chloromethyl 
methyl ether 
3. Others 
Isopropyl oils 
Wood dusts 
Leather dusts 
sufficiene 
Lung 
Nasal sinuses 
Nasal cavity 
and sinuses 
Nasal cavity 
and sinuses, 
urine bladder 
B. INORGANIC SUBSTANCES 
1. Minerals and metals 
Arsenic Lungs, skin 
Beryllium 
Cadmium 
Chromium Lung 
limited 
Larynx 
Liver 
(angiosarcoma) 
Lung 
Prostate, 
kidney, lung 
Nasal cavity 
and sinuses, 
larynx 
inadequate 
Hematopoietic 
tissues 
(leukemia) 
47 
Occupations2 
Lon-exchange resin makers; 
organic chemical 
synthesizers; polymer makers 
Producers 
Lumbermen; workers with 
wood 
Leather and shoe workers 
Miners; smelters; insecticide 
and herbicide makers and 
sprayers; tanners; chemical 
workers; oil refining workers; 
vintners; alloy makers; 
aniline color makers; ceramic 
makers; copper smelters; 
textile printers 
Aerospace industry, 
gyroscopes and nuclear 
reactor workers; beryllium 
refining and alloy workers; 
cathode ray tube makers; 
electric equipment makers; 
electronic workers 
Alloy makers; battery 
makers; pesticide workers; 
textile printers; welders; zinc 
refiners; electroplaters 
Producers and processors; 
acetylene and aniline 
workers; bleachers; glass, 
pottery and linoleum 
workers; battery makers; 
anodizers; electroplaters; 
glass workers; lithographers; 
photoengravers 
48 
Substance 
Hematite 
Nickel 
Asbestos 
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TABLE 1. Continued 
Category of evidence and site 
sufficiene limited inadequate 
Lung Larynx 
Lungs, nasal 
Lung, pleura Larynx, colon 
and 
peritoneum 
(mesothelioma) 
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Occupations2 
Iron ore (hematite) miners; 
metal grinders and polishers; 
iron foundry workers 
Nickel smelters; mixers and 
roasters; electrolysis workers 
Miners; millers; textile, 
insulations, and shipyard 
workers; brake linings 
workers 
Source: Cole & Merletti, Chemical Agents and Occupational Cancer, 3 J. ENVTL. PATHOLOGY & TOXICOL· 
OGY 399, 400 (1980). 
1 "Sufficient" refers to the fact that human data are considered persuasive of carcinogenicity in humans: 
"limited," evidence exists for humans but is too limited to be persuasive; and, "inadequate," human data i~ 
not sufficient to allow a reliable conclusion. 
2 Represents only a partial list. 
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TABLE 2. 
Workers Exposure to Carcinogens and Suspected Carcinogens for 2·Digit Industries in 
the Manufacturing Sector 
SIC Industry Worker Exposures 
to Carcinogens 
20 Food and Kindred Products 2,874 
21 Tobacco Manufacturers 13,885 
22 Textile Mills 2,607 
23 Apparel 7,591 
24 Lumber and Wood Products 5,588 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 4,309 
26 Paper and Allied Products 14,205 
27 Printing and Publishing 19,625 
28 Chemical and Allied 25,984 
Products 
29 Petroleum and Coal 38,398 
Products 
30 Rubber and Plastics 16,987 
31 Leather and Leather 40,599 
Products 
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass 11,985 
33 Primary Metals 24,367 
34 Fabricated Metal 90,428 
35 Machinery (Except Elect.) 51,927 
36 Electrical Machinery 81,533 
37 Transportation Equipment 53,574 
38 Instruments 107,023 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 27,459 
Source: 
Hickey & Kearney, Engineering Control Research and Development Plan for Carcinogenic 
Materials 29 table 7 (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Sept. 1977). 
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TABLE 3. 
The Determinants of Small Firm Entry (SFE): Results of Regression Analysis. 
(N = 17). 
Parameter Standard 
Variable Estimate Error T-Ratio 
Intercept -27.80872 29.00323 -.9588 
Expected Occupational 
Disease Liability (EODL) .00072 .00026 2.7698*** 
Industry Concentration 
Ratio (CR) 6.95435 48.40869 .1437 
Product Differentiation 
(PD) 5.28965 9.44547 .5600 
Industry Growth (IG) .60150 .26440 2.2750** 
Regional Markets (RM) -.05219 .05228 -.09983 
Energy Costs (EC) 39.97950 21. 74551 1.8385* 
R = .7262; d.f. = .10; F = 4.42*** 
*p < .1 
**p < .05 
***p < .01 
TABLE 4. 
Coverage of Occupational Diseases* January 1, 1985 
Jurisdiction 
ALABAMA 
ALASKA 
AMERICAN 
SAMOA 
ARIZONA 
Onset of Disability or Death 
Death-within 3 years after last 
exposure or last payment. Radiation 
or occupational pneumoconiosis*-
exposure must occur in at least 12 
months over 5 years prior to last 
exposure. 
Silicosis or asbestosis-employer 
liable only if exposure during 2 
years. 
Time Limit on Claim Filing 
Disability-within 2 years after last 
exposure or last payment 
(radiation-within 2 years and 
claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment). Death-
within 2 years after death or last 
payment. Coal miner's 
pneumoconiosis-within 3 years 
after total disability or death and 
claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment. 
2 years after knowledge of relation 
to employment. Within 1 year after 
death. 
Within 1 year after claimant knows/ 
should know relation to 
employment. 
Within 1 year after disability or 
accrual of right; excusable. * 
1987] 
Jurisdiction 
ARKANSAS 
CALIFORNIA 
COLORADO 
CONNECTICUT 
DELAWARE 
DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 
FLORIDA 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
Onset of Disability or Death 
Disability or death-within 1 year 
after last exposure (3 years for 
silicosis or asbestosis), or 7 years 
for death following continuous 
disability. * Does not apply to 
radiation. Silicosis or asbestosis 
presumed nonoccupational absent 
exposure in 5 years over 10 years 
prior to disability (2 of 5 years in-
state unless same employer). 
Disability-within 5 years after 
injury (no limit for radiation, 
asbestosis, silicosis, or anthracosis). 
Silicosis or asbestosis--employer 
liable only if exposure lasts 60 days. 
Death-following continuous 
disability and within 350 weeks 
after last exposure. Employer liable 
for dust disease only if exposure 
lasts 60 days. 
Time Limit on Claim Filing 
Disability-within 2 years after last 
exposure (silicosis or asbestosis--
within 1 year from disablement; 
radiation-within 2 years from 
diagnosis). Death-within 2 years. 
Disability-within 1 year from 
injury or last payment. Death-
within 1 year after death (for death 
within 1 year after injury); 1 year 
after last medical payment; or 1 
year after death if compensation 
paid; no proceedings more than 240 
weeks after injury except for claims 
based on asbestos exposure. * 
Within 3 years after disability or 
death (5 years in case of ionizing 
radiation, asbestosis, silicosis, or 
anthracosis or if reasonable excuse). 
Within 3 years after first 
manifestation of disease (within 2 
years if death occurs within 2 years 
after first manifestation of disease, 
or 1 year after death, whichever is 
later). 
Disability or death-within 1 year 
after claimant knows relation to 
employment. 
Within 1 year after injury, death, 
last payment, or knowledge of 
relation to employment. 
Within 2 years after disablement, 
death, or last payment. 
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Jurisdiction 
GEORGIA 
GUAM 
HAWAII 
IDAHO 
ILLINOIS 
INDIANA 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
Onset of Disability or Death Time Limit on Claim Filing 
.-----------------------------------------
Within 1 year after last exposure (3 
years for byssinosis, silicosis, or 
asbestosis; 7 years for death 
following continuous disability). 
Employer liable for silicosis or 
asbestosis only if exposure lasts 60 
days; presumed nonoccupational 
absent exposure in 5 years over 10 
years prior to disability (2 years in-
state unless same employer). ** 
Within 1 year after last exposure (4 
years for silicosis; 7 years for death 
following continuous disability). 
Employer liable for nonacute 
disease only if exposure lasts 60 
days. Silicosis---exposure must 
occur in 5 years during 10 years 
prior to disablement (last 2 in-state 
unless same employer). 
Disability-within 2 years after last 
exposure (3 years for berylliosis or 
silicosis, 25 years for asbestosis or 
radiation). 
Disablement-within 2 years after 
last exposure (3 years if caused by 
asbestos, coal, or silica dust); 
radiation-within 2 years after 
claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment. Death-
within 2 years after disablement or 
during pendency of disability claim 
filed within that period; within 2 
years after fixed disability expires 
but no later than 300 weeks after 
disablement. Employer liable for 
silicosis or asbestosis only if 
exposure lasts 60 days. 
Within 1 year after disablement, 
death, or medical care, or 2 years 
after last payment. * Radiation-
within 1 year after onset of 
disability and claimant knows/should 
know relation to employment. * 
Within 1 year after injury, death, or 
last payment. 
Within 2 years after claimant knows 
relation to employment. 
Within 1 year after manifestation or 
death. Silicosis-within 4 years 
after last exposure. Radiation or 
unusual disease-within 1 year after 
incapacity, disability, or death and 
claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment. 
Disability-within 3 years after 
disablement or 2 years after last 
payment. Death-within 3 years 
after death or last payment. 
Coalminer's pneumoconiosis-within 
5 years after last exposure or last 
payment. Radiation or asbestosis-
within 25 years after last exposure. 
Within 2 years after disablement or 
death. 
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IOWA 
KANSAS 
KENTUCKY 
LOUISIANA 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
Onset of Disability or Death 
Disability or death-within 1 year 
after last exposure (3 years for 
pneumoconiosis; 7 years for death 
following continuous disability). 
Pneumoconiosis presumed 
nonoccupational absent exposure in 
5 years over 10 years prior to 
disability (2 of 5 years in-state); 
employer liable only if exposure 
lasts 60 days. 
Disability or death-within 1 year 
after last exposure (3 years for 
death from silicosis, 7 years for 
death following continuous 
disability). Does not apply to 
radiation. Silicosis presumed 
nonoccupational absent exposure in 
5 years over 10 years prior to 
disability (2 of 5 years in-state 
unless same employer); employer 
li.able only if exposure lasts 60 days. 
Diseases contracted in less than 1 
year presumed to be 
nonoccupational. Presumption is 
rebuttable by "overwhelming 
preponderance of evidence." 
Time Limit on Claim Filing 
Within 2 years after death or 
disablement or 3 years after last 
payment. * Radiation-within 90 
days after disablement or death and 
claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment. 
Within 1 year after disablement, 
death, or last payment (2 years 
after last payment in case of 
silicosis). Radiation-within 1 year 
after claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment. 
Disability-within 3 years after last 
exposure or first manifestation. 
Death-within 3 years, if it occurs 
within 3 years after last exposure 
or first manifestation. Limit waived 
where voluntary payment or 
employer knows of disease and 
cause. No claim more than 5 years 
after last exposure (20 years in case 
of radiation), except for death 
within 20 years after continuous 
disability begins in cases where 
there is award or timely claim for 
disability. ** 
Disability-within 6 months after 
manifestation, occurrence of 
disability, or worker knows/should 
know relation to employment. 
Death-within 6 months, or within 
6 months after worker knows/should 
know relation to employment. 
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MAINE 
MARYLAND 
MASSACHUSETTS 
MICHIGAN 
MINNESOTA 
MISSISSIPPI 
MISSOURI 
MONTANA 
NEBRASKA 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
Onset of Disability or Death 
Incapacity-within 3 years after 
last exposure (does not apply to 
asbestos-related disease). Employer 
liable only if exposure lasts 60 days 
(except for radiation and asbestos-
related disease). Silicosis presumed 
nonoccupational absent in-state 
exposure in 2 years during 15 years 
preceding disability (part of 
exposure may be out of state if 
same employer). 
Last employer liable for silicosis, 
asbestosis and radiation if exposure 
lasts 90 days. * 
Death-within 3 years after last 
employment unless continuous total 
disability (does not apply to 
radiation). Silicosis-total disability 
or death must occur within 3 years 
after last employment (except for 
death following continuous total 
disability), and employer is liable 
only if exposure lasts 90 
workshifts. * 
Time Limit on Claim Filing 
Within 2 years after incapacity or 1 
year after death or last payment (40 
years after last payment for 
asbestos-related disease). * If 
mistake of fact, within reasonable 
time but no later than 10 years 
after last payment. Radiation-limit 
runs from date of incapacity and 
claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment. 
Within 2 years after disablement, 
death, or actual knowledge of 
relation to employment; excusable 
(3 years for pulmonary dust 
disease). 
Within 1 year after injury, or death; 
excusable. 
Within 2 years after claimant 
knows/should know relation to 
employment. 
Within 3 years after employee's 
knowledge of cause of injury or 
disability. 
Within 2 years after injury* or 
death. 
Within 2 years after injury, death, 
or last payment (3 years if no injury 
report filed); limitation runs from 
date injury is reasonably apparent. 
Within 1 year after disability and 
claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment; may be 
extended 2 more years. No claim 
more than 3 years after last 
employment (except for radiation or 
death after continuous total 
disability). ** 
Within 2 years after knew/should 
have known of injury and relation 
to employment. 
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NEVADA 
NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 
NEW JERSEY 
NEW MEXICO 
NEW YORK 
NORTH 
CAROLINA 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
Onset of Disability or Death 
Silicosis or respiratory dust disease 
is noncompensable absent in-state 
exposure in 3 years during 10 years 
preceding disability or death. 
Death-within 1 year after last 
employment (3 years for death 
following continuous disability), and 
death must follow disability within 2 
years. Silicosis or asbestosis-
disability or death within 2 years 
after last employment (5 years for 
death following continuous 
disability); employer is liable only if 
exposure lasts 60 days; 
noncompensable absent in-state 
exposure in 1250 workshifts during 
10 years preceding disability. 
Radiation--<iisability or death 
within 10 years after last 
employment. 
Death within 2 years after injury; if 
totally disabled 6 years after injury 
or 2 years after final determination. 
Asbestosis--<iisability or death 
within 10 years after last exposure; 
for death following continuous 
disability, disability must occur 
within 10 years after last 
exposure. * Lead poisoning-
disability or death within 2 years 
after last exposure; for death 
following continuous disability, 
disability must occur within 2 years 
after last exposure. 
Time Limit on Claim Filing 
Within 90 days after knowledge of 
disability and relation to 
employment or 1 year after death. 
Silicosis or respiratory dust 
disease-within 1 year after 
temporary or total disability or 
death. 
Within 2 years after injury or death 
and claimant knows/should know of 
injury and relation to employment. * 
Within 2 years after claimant knows 
relation to employment or last 
payment. 
Within 1 year after disability or 
death of 1 year 31 days after last 
voluntary payment. Radiation-
within 1 year after disability begins 
or death and claimant knows/should 
know relation to employment. 
Within 2 years after disablement or 
death, or two years after claimant 
knows/should know relation to 
employment. 
Within 2 years after disablement, 
death, or last payment, or within 2 
years of notification by competent 
medical authority, whichever last 
occurs. Radiation-within 2 years 
after incapacity and claimant knows/ 
should know relation to 
employment. 
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NORTH 
DAKOTA 
OHIO 
OKLAHOMA 
OREGON 
PENNSYLVANIA 
PUERTO RICO 
RHODE ISLAND 
SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
SOUTH 
DAKOTA 
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TABLE 4. Continued 
Onset of Disability or Death 
Death-within 1 year after injury if 
no disability, or 1 year after 
cessation of disability, or 6 years 
after injury if disability is 
continuous. 
Employer liable for silicosis or 
asbestosis only if exposure lasts 60 
days. 
Within 300 weeks after last 
exposure (except death following 
disability that occurs within 300 
weeks after last exposure). Silicosis, 
anthracosilicosis, or coalminer's 
pneumoconiosis-noncompensable 
absent in-state exposure in 2 years 
during 10 years preceding 
disability. * 
Disability-within 1 year after last 
exposure, except diseases with 
longer latency periods. 
Disease must be contracted within 1 
year after last exposure (2 years for 
pulmonary dust disease); except 
radiation. Byssinosis is 
noncompensable absent exposure 
for 7 years. 
Silicosis-noncompensable absent 
in-state exposure in 2 years (in-
state requirement waived if same 
employer); employer liable only if 
exposure lasts 60 days. 
Time Limit on Claim Filing 
Within 1 year after injury; within 2 
years after death (2 years after 
injury if no claim prior to death). * 
Within 2 years after disability or 
death or within 6 months after 
diagnosis (whichever is later). 
Within 18 months after last 
exposure or manifestation and 
diagnosis by a physician, or within 3 
months after disablement. 
Within 5 years after last exposure 
and within 180 days after 
disablement or physician informs 
claimant of disablement. 10 years 
after last exposure for radiation 
disease. * 
Within 3 years after disablement, 
death, or last payment. Radiation-
within 3 years after the employee 
knows/should know relation to 
employment. 
Within 3 years from time employee 
learns nature of disability. 
Within 3 years after disability or 
death. Radiation-within 1 year 
after claimant knows/should know 
relation to employment. 
Within 2 years after definitive 
diagnosis or 1 year after death. 
Radiation-limitation runs from 
date of disability and claimant 
knows/should know relation to 
employment. 
Within 2 years after disability or 
death. Radiation-within 1 year 
after disability and claimant knows 
relation to employment. 
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Jurisdiction 
TENNESSEE 
TEXAS 
UTAH 
VERMONT 
VIRGIN 
ISLANDS 
VIRGINIA 
WASHINGTON 
TABLE 4. Continued 
Onset of Disability or Death 
Partial disability-within 2 years 
after last exposure. Total 
disability-within 1 year after last 
employment; for silicosis, 3 years 
(uncomplicated) or 5 years 
(complicated). Death-within 3 
years after last employment (5 
years for complicated silicosis or 
death following continuous total 
disability). Not applicable to 
radiation. Silicosis-noncompensable 
absent 5 years in-state exposure in 
15 years preceding disability; 
employer liable only if exposure 
lasts 30 days. 
Disablement-within 5 years after 
last exposure. Death-during 
employment or after continuous 
disability beginning within 5 years 
after last exposure, but no later 
than 12 years after last exposure. 
Does not apply to radiation. 
Exposure in 90 workshifts 
conclusively presumed injurious 
exposure. 
Time Limit on Claim Filing 
Within 1 year after incapacity or 
death. 
Within 1 year after injury or first 
distinct manifestation, 1 year after 
death. May be extended. 
Within 1 year after incapacity or 
death and claimant knows/should 
know relation to employment, but 
no later than 3 years after death. 
Permanent partial disability-within 
2 years. 
Within 1 year after discovery, 
death, or last payment. Radiation-
within 1 year after first incapacity 
and worker knew/should have 
known relation to employment. 
Within 60 days after disability. 
Within 2 years after diagnosis is 
first communicated to worker, or 
within 5 years after last exposure, 
whichever is first. * Within 3 years 
after death occurring within periods 
for disability. 
Within 2 years after physician's 
written notice to claimant. 
*Chart excerpted from United States Chamber of Commerce, Analysis of Workers' Compensation 
Laws (1985). 
Ala. *Radiation illness caused by gradual exposure. 
Ariz. *Limit on filing runs from when injury is manifest or when claimant knows/should know relation 
to employment; tolled during incapacity. 
Ark. *Silicosis or asbestosis-worker who is affected but not disabled may leave work and receive 
up to 26 weeks of benefits plus up to $400 for retraining. 
Cal. *Date of injury is date of disability and claimant knows/should know relation to employment. 
Ga. *Byssinosis claims diagnosed before July 1, 1983, must be filed before July 1, 1984. 
**Year is 200 days exposure over 12 months. 
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Iowa *Death from respiratory disease of coalminer employed 10 years presumed due to pneumocon-
iosis. 
**Effective 7/1184, 33% threshold requirement repealed; benefits now payable are prospective only. 
Ky. *Black lung claimant must file under state and federal law. 
Me. *Claim for asbestos-related disease contracted between 11130/67 and 10/1183 must be filed by 
111185. 
Md. *Disease or injury compensable under federal law (other than Social Security Disability Insur-
ance) is not compensable. 
Miss. *For radiation, date of disablement is date of injury. 
Mo. *By court decision. Does not apply to insurer. Bollman v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 651 
S. W.2d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 
Mont. *Silicosis is noncompensable absent in-state exposure in 1,000 workshifts during 8 years 
preceding total disability; claimant who is discharged to avoid liability may receive compensation 
when totally disabled if employed 700 workshifts. 
N.H. *Date of injury is last date of exposure or first date worker knowslshould know relation to 
employment. 
N. Y. *Disability or death due to silicosis or dust disease reimbursed from special fund for all payments 
over 104 weeks. 
N.C. *Asbestosis or silicosis is noncompensable absent in-state exposure in 2 years during 10 years 
preceding last exposure or if exposure is less than 30 working days in 7 consecutive months. 
N.D. *Date of injury is date on which a reasonable person knowslshousld know relation to employ-
ment. 
Or. * Asbestos-related disease-within 40 years after last exposure and 180 days after disability or 
knowledge of disability. 
Pa. *Under Occupational Disease Act, state pays $125 monthly for total disability or death caused 
by silicosis, anthracosilicosis, coalminer's pneumoconiosis, or asbestosis, provided there has been 2 
years of in-state exposure, in cases where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and the 
last exposure occurred before 1965 or where exposure occurred under several employers. 
Va. *5-year limitation does not apply to cataract of the eyes, skin cancer, radium disability, ulceration, 
undulant fever, angiosarcoma of the liver due to vinyl chloride exposure, or mesothelioma; byssinosis-
within 7 years after last exposure; coalminer's pneumoconiosis-within 3 years after diagnosis; as-
bestosis-within 2 years after diagnosis (if based on changed condition, within 2 years after diagnosis 
of advanced stage). 
